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ABSTRACT 
 
Completing the Circle Around Rabaul: 
The Seizure of the Admiralties, 
February to May 1944 
 
by 
David Osborn Scott 
 
This study examines the operational history of the First Cavalry Divisions conquest of the 
Admiralty Islands during World War Two as the final phase of Operation Cartwheel. 
Cartwheel called a two pronged attack; one prong in New Guinea, by-passing large 
Japanese garrisons and the other in the northern Solomon Islands with the goal the 
isolation of the strong point at Rabaul. 
The material is drawn primarily from U.S. Army records held by the National Archives at 
College Park, Maryland, records from the Air Force Historical Research Agency at 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama and other reports. 
The study concludes that the conquest of the Admiralty Islands allowed the by-pass of 
Rabaul and Wewak, New Guinea. The Admiralty Islands served as a base for future 
operations carried out against the Japanese.  
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND 
 
 The Admiralty Islands are located in the western Pacific about 200 miles 
northeast of Papua New Guinea. The islands are 360 miles to Rabaul by air, 500 miles by 
air or 1,000 miles by sea to Port Moresby, New Guinea. Airfields, and the room to 
construct more, and the large natural harbor of the islands made the islands important 
strategic objectives during World War II.  The airfields on the islands are 75 miles closer 
to Truk, 190 miles closer to Saipan, and 530 miles closer to Palau than the airfields at 
Rabaul. 
 Manus is the largest island in the group. It is about 50 miles long from west to 
east and 20 miles across at its widest point. At the eastern end of Manus, and separated 
from it by the narrow Loniu Passage, lies the crescent-shaped island of Los Negros. 
Enclosed on its eastern and northern sides by the horn of Los Negros is the principal 
harbor, Seeadler, its entrance guarded by a series of islets set on the reef running east-
west off the north coast of Manus.1
 The Admiralty Islands have an interesting history. First discovered in 1615 by 
Willem Schouten, the islands were named in honor of the British Admiralty in 1767. 
German missionaries and planters were the first Europeans to settle there in 1884. The  
islands were occupied by the Australians in 1914; in 1921 the League of Nations 
mandated them to Australia. At the start of World War II the Australians had a small 
detachment of the Australian Defense Force and a regional police protecting and 
administering the Admiralty Islands.2
 
                                                 
 1 Peter Ryan,  Ed., Encyclopaedia of Papua And New Guinea, 3 vols. (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press,  1972), II, 695. 
 2 Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol.4, The 
Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944,  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), 
555, hereafter, Craven, and Cate, Guadalcanal to Saipan. 
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 Figure 1. Overview of the Admiralty Islands. Adapted from the First Cavalry Division 
Historical Report, Record Group 407, located at the National Archives and Records 
Administration, College Park, MD. 
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The Admiralty Islands at the Start of World War Two 
 The nineteen men of Australian Army force, Number 4 Section, ‘B’ Platoon, First 
Independent Company, had arrived in November 1941. The Australian Independent 
Companies were trained to act like the British Commandos. All members were trained in 
survival, explosives, communications, and effective fighting. Number 4 Section occupied 
three huts in Lorengau on Manus Island. Number 4 Section joined forces with a small 
detachment of Australian Infantry, the District Officer, a Police Master, and a civilian 
radio operator. The first order of business was to improve the small airfield at Lorengau. 
Using native labor, the airfield was rolled with coral into a hardened surface. When done 
the airfield was 3,600 feet long, complete with two aviation fuel dumps.3  
 To protect the radio antenna, the Australians dug a gun pit for a Bren light 
machine gun to provide anti-aircraft fire. The airfield received a second Bren gun and a 
Vickers medium machine gun for defense. On 12 January 1942 three Australian Catalina 
PBYs, stopped so that their fuel tanks could be topped off for a raid on the Japanese base 
at Truk. On a second mission the Catalinas returned for refueling on 15 January and left 
behind an aerial gunner who was quickly attached to Number 4 Section. These were the 
last Allied aircraft to land in the Admiralties until after the invasion in 1944.4
 
The U.S. Enters the War 
 For the United States, World War II began with the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii. The Basic Plan of the Japanese had three phases. The first phase was the 
attack directed against the United States fleet at Pearl Harbor and other coordinated 
attacks against Allied forces in the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, and Singapore. The 
second phase planned on the Japanese consolidating their positions and reinforcing their 
defensive perimeter. Third, all Allied attacks against the Japanese perimeter would be 
                                                 
 3 Manus Island, Experience of No. 4 Section, ‘B’ Platoon, First Independent Company, Australian 
Imperial Force, based on the recollections of Lieutenant Palmer, Lance-Corporal Normoyle, Sapper Kerr 
and Private Coker, available at http://www.geocities.com/dutcheastindies/manus.html Hereafter, First 
Independent Company. For the Japanese records see  Organization of 8th Fleet: Senshi Sosho, Nanto Homen 
Kaigun Sakusen, 1, Gato Dakkai Sakusen Kaishimade, Boeicho Boei Kenshujo, Senshishitsu, Asagumo 
Shinbun Sha, September 28, 1971, 372-74 (War History Series, Southeast Area Navy Operations, Part 1, 
Up to the Start of the Guadalcanal Recapturing Operations, Defense Agency, Defense Research Institute, 
Office of War History). Translated by Hitomi Kinuhata.     
 4 First Independent Company 
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intercepted and destroyed with other operations conducted as needed that would be 
designed to destroy the American will to fight. With the three phases complete the 
Japanese would have met their goals for the war and would be self sufficient. Because of 
the relative ease of the first phase of operations the Japanese decided to speed up the 
second phase of the plan of expansion. Port Moresby in New Guinea needed to be 
captured in order to strengthen the positions in New Guinea and the Bismarck Islands. 
Midway Island would be captured in order to force a decisive engagement with the 
United States fleet and strengthen positions in the central Pacific. The northern front 
would be strengthened by the capture of islands in the western Aleutians of Alaska. Once 
these objectives had been achieved the Japanese planned to capture New Caledonia, Fiji, 
and Samoa. With these islands in Japanese hands Australia would be cut off from 
reinforcements from the United States.5
 
Japanese Advances 
 After the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese continued to advance southward in 
the Pacific. While the Japanese 14th Army was fighting the American and Filipino forces 
in the Philippine Islands, the Japanese 25th Army was attacking British forces in 
Singapore. The Japanese 16th Army was attacking the Dutch in the East Indies to gain 
control of the oil, rubber, and other natural resources in the region. Another prong of the 
Japanese advance, the South Seas Detachment, moved to isolate Australia and its advance 
bases in the southwest Pacific. Utilizing these bases, the Japanese hoped to disrupt the 
Allied lines of communication.  
 The Japanese offensive in the southwest Pacific centered on the harbor and air 
fields of Rabaul. The Japanese began with air raids against Rabaul in January 1941. On 
21 and 22 January an aircraft carrier force began pre-invasion raids. The Japanese South 
Sea Detachment, commanded by Major General Tomitare Horii, and the 4th Fleet 
attacked Rabaul before dawn on 23 January 1942. Horii’s forces quickly seized the town, 
Lakunai airfield, and the port of Rabaul.  In a matter of days they took Vunakanau 
                                                 
 5 United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division. New York, Greenwood Press, 1969) 2-
3, hereafter, USSBS, Pacific Bombing Survey. 
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airfield west of Rabaul, and Australians defending Rabaul were either captured or 
escaped to New Guinea and Australia.6
 The Japanese followed the landings at Rabaul with attacks on Lorengau in the 
Admiralty Islands on 25 January 1942 with three separate air raids conducted with two or 
three sea planes. The air attacks killed one native but managed to miss their supposed 
target of the radio station. The Australian defenders claimed to have shot down two 
planes. The Australians began to destroy anything that would be of value to the enemy 
and waited for the invasion they knew was coming. The plan for destroying the fuel 
dumps was to toss in a grenade and run.7
 
The Japanese Invade the Admiralty Islands 
 On 8 April 1942 the Japanese light cruiser, Tatsuta, destroyer, Mutsuki, and the 
troop transport, Mishima Maru, arrived in Seeadler Harbor. A detachment of the 8th 
Special Base Force landed, damaged the airfield at Lorengau and destroyed some of the 
Australian buildings. After building facilities for communications, the Japanese attack 
force departed for Rabaul on 11 April. The Japanese left behind the 51st Transportation 
Regiment to improve the airfield at Lorengau and to provide defense for the islands. The 
Australians and remaining Europeans retreated deeper into the jungle on Manus, moving 
about 20 kilometers down Number Three Road to the village of Bulihat. The Australians 
began actively patrolling the Japanese positions. After several patrols without any 
causalities on either side the Australians realized they were running out of supplies and 
the promised relief was not coming. They decided to evacuate the island on their own.8
 The Australians had thought ahead and requisitioned two boats for this purpose 
which they hid on the southern coast of Manus. The detachment marched for five days 
until they reached the first boat, the launch Fidelis. The other boat, the ketch Edith, had 
been seen by the Japanese and was lit at night by a search light from a Japanese ship. The 
Australian Commander decided he would go to the Edith and survey the situation. When 
                                                 
 6 John B. Lundstrom, The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy, December 1941-
June 1942, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976), 24, hereafter, Lundstrom, First South Pacific 
Campaign. The Japanese records are available in, Library of Congress microfilm Southeast Area of 
Operations Record (Army), Japanese Monograph No. 143, hereafter Japanese Monograph No. 143. 
 7 First Independent Company 
 8 First Independent Company 
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he got there he found the search light off, so he swam aboard, raised sail and headed for a 
rendezvous with the remainder of his party. On 17 April the group headed for the coast of 
New Guinea. After contacting Port Moresby they were told to head for Astrolabe Bay 
then head inland to Mount Hagen, finally arriving on 16 May.9
 With the Admiralties firmly in control, the Japanese did little to improve the one 
primitive airstrip at Lorengau. Not until early in 1943 was the field at Lorengau improved 
by the 51st Transportation Regiment and work started on a new field on Los Negros, 
Momote, which was not completed until late in 1943. Once put into operation, these two 
airfields were used as staging areas for Japanese aircraft flying between Rabaul, Wewak, 
and Hollandia. The islands were defended by Japanese Navy elements of the 36th Air 
Defense Unit and the 88th Military Patrol concentrated around Lorengau. In the great 
natural harbor, Seeadler, the Japanese built defensive fortifications as protection against 
Allied attacks.10
 
Japanese Advances Continue 
 From Rabaul, the Japanese continued their advance down through the Solomon 
Islands and against New Guinea in an inverted V. With both flanks secure, the lines of 
communication to Australia would be threatened and the Japanese could attack Australia. 
Japanese bomber forces attacked Darwin, Australia for the first time on 19 February  
1942. Other raids continued until the end of May. The Japanese attacked Tulagi in the  
Solomon Islands 3 May 1942 and immediately established a seaplane base. With a base 
on Tulagi the Japanese could provide support and reconnaissance to forces trying to  
move southeast against the New Hebrides, Fiji and New Caledonia. As part of the Tulagi  
invasion plans, an airfield was to be built on the near-by island of Guadalcanal. 
                                                 
 9 First Independent Company 
10 Senshi Sosho, Nanto Homen Kaigun Sakusen 3: Gadarukanaru Tou Tesshu Go. Boeicho Boei 
Kenshujo Senshishitsu Asagumo Shinbun Sha, August, 1976, 5-7 (War History Series, Southeast Area 
Naval Operations after the Guadalcanal withdrawal, Part 3, Defense Agency, Defense Research Institute, 
Office of War History, August, 1976), 490, hereafter, Senshi Sosho, Vol. 96. Translated by Hitomi 
Kinuhata. For actions of the American Army Air Force see, Major Harris G. Warren, The Fifth Air Force in 
the Conquest of the Bismark Archipelago: November 1943 to March 1944, Army Air Force Historical 
Studies: No. 43 United States Air Force Historical Division, Maxwell, A.F.B., Alabama, 101-43, hereafter, 
Warren, Fifth Air Force.  
 11
 While Japanese forces were advancing on Tulagi another landing force was 
advancing on Port Moresby, New Guinea.  The Allied facilities at Port Moresby 
threatened the entire Japanese war in the Pacific. If Japanese bases could be maintained 
and Allied lines of communication disrupted the Japanese could consolidate their 
positions and reinforce their forces at leisure. This would have either forced the Allies to 
accept a negotiated peace or to extend the length of the war several years. The United 
States forces knew that the Japanese would next attempt to invade Port Moresby. General 
Douglas MacArthur, Commander Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), realized that Port 
Moresby was crucial to the Allied plans for stopping the Japanese. The Port Moresby 
landing force was detected and intercepted by an American and Australian naval force 
and in the battle of the Coral Sea in early May 1942, forced to turn back.11  
 In early June 1942 the Japanese attempted to capture the American held islands of 
the Midway atoll. American planes from aircraft carriers intercepted the invading forces 
and sank four Japanese aircraft carriers. As a result of the defeat at Midway the Japanese 
lost the momentum that had driven their war effort.  
 
America Counterattacks 
 To counter the Japanese offensives in the Pacific, the United States Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) put a three-phase plan to paper in the JCS Directive of 2 July 1942. The first 
phase covered the seizure of Tulagi and Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. Phase two 
covered the capture of the remainder of the Solomon Islands, Lae, Salamaua, and other 
locations on the eastern coast of New Guinea. Phase three was the capture of Rabaul and 
its surrounding positions, including the Admiralties. Shortly after receiving the JCS July 
Directive, MacArthur met with the Commander of the Pacific Ocean Area (COMPOA), 
Admiral Chester Nimitz, in Melbourne, Australia. The two commanders agreed that the 
operations would be carried out on two basic principles. First, the advance of a series of 
air bases to provide air umbrellas covering the eastern coast of New Guinea and the 
Solomon Islands; second, the isolation of Rabaul before the final assault.12  
                                                 
 11 Samuel E. Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May 1942-August 1942 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1988), 21-64, hereafter, Morison, Coral Sea. 
 12John Miller, Jr., Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul (Washington: Center of Military History, 
,1959) ,5, hereafter, Miller, Cartwheel). Louis B. Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, 
 12
 Despite the Japanese strategic defeat at Coral Sea the Japanese knew that Port 
Moresby still had to be taken, so they and landed troops at Buna on the eastern coast of 
New Guinea on 21 and 22 July 1942. Once Buna was secure, the Japanese began 
construction of an airfield that would provide air cover for the troops that would be 
attacking Port Moresby. The Japanese then began an overland attack against Port 
Moresby by crossing the Owen Stanley mountain range on the Kokoda Track. On maps 
the track is emphasized and appears to be a major route. The reality is much different. 
The track is a series of steep trails with numerous stream and river crossings.13
When the Australians realized that this was the goal of the Japanese they 
advanced against the Japanese invaders and fought the Japanese at every creek crossing 
and bend in the track. As the Japanese advanced their supply lines became longer while 
the supply lines for the Australians became shorter. The Japanese advanced to within 
twenty air miles of Port Moresby until Australian resistance, along with starvation and 
disease, brought them to a halt. The Japanese were left with no choice but to retreat 
towards Buna, leaving rear guard elements to hold or slow the Australian and American 
troops following them along the track. Between the terrain and the attacking Australian 
infantry on the Kokoda Track the Japanese were doomed. The Allies advanced over the 
Owen Stanley mountain range by foot and air. Other Allied forces were moved along the 
coast by small ships which landed south of Buna. Not only were the Japanese fighting the 
Australians at every creek crossing, trail intersection, and natural ambush position, they 
were also struggling against some of the most inhospitable terrain and fauna in the world. 
After a long and bloody fight the Allies were in control of the eastern coast of New 
Guinea around Buna. Existing airfields had been recaptured and new ones built as the 
troops advanced.14
While the Japanese were making their attempt to capture Port Moresby they were 
also busy on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. After they had captured Tulagi the 
Japanese decided to build an airfield on Guadalcanal. When the Allies realized that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Washington: Center of Military History, 1962), 154-180, 240-263, hereafter, Morton, Strategy. The JCS 
Directive of July 1942 is also covered in Lundstrom, First South Pacific Campaign, 19-21. 
 13 USSB, Pacific Bombing Survey. For the best account of the fighting along the Kokoda Trail see 
Dudley McCarthy, Australia in World War II, South-West Pacific Area- First Year, (Canberra: Australian 
War Memorial, 1959). 
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Japanese were building an airfield that could support bombers and fighters which threaten 
supply routes to Australia, they knew that it must be captured. In August, the United 
States Navy landed the First Marine Division near the airfield. The Japanese only offered 
a token resistance to the Marine landing. When the Japanese destroyed the Allied 
covering force in the Battle of Savo Island, the American transports withdrew from the 
area without offloading ammunition and other supplies for the Marines. Once the 
Japanese realized that the Marine landing force was going to stay they began to reinforce 
the defending forces. The Japanese air forces began to raid the Marines almost daily with 
flights from Rabaul. The Americans responded by completing the airfield and sending in 
an ever increasing number of aircraft.15   
The resulting battle for Guadalcanal lasted almost six months and involved land, 
sea, and air forces. Once Guadalcanal was secure, the Allies could begin a series of 
landing operations up the Solomon Island chain with each operation supported by air and 
sea forces from the position previously captured. In order to secure the western flank, the 
Allies continued to advance up the coast of New Guinea capturing ports and airfields. In 
early 1943, the surviving Japanese evacuated Buna and Guadalcanal. 16
 Japanese advances against Port Moresby in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands 
had to be contained before any grand strategy could be put into action. The mandate by 
the JCS for attacks against the Solomons demanded that the forces in the Pacific be 
increased from the minimum needed for defense of the area to units needed for the 
planned offensives. Once Guadalcanal and Tulagi were securely in Allied hands, the 
strategy to advance up the Solomon Islands and the coast of New Guinea could begin.17
 In December 1942 Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and 
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, proposed bypassing the Solomon Islands 
entirely, capturing the Admiralty Islands, and thus isolating Rabaul without a series of 
frontal assaults in the Solomon Islands. Nimitz responded with a letter explaining that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 14 For detailed accounts of the Buna campaign see Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua  (Washington: 
Center of Military Histiry:1957). Lida Mayo, Bloody Buna (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1974).   
15 John Miller, Jr. Guadalcanal: The First Offensive (Washington: Center of Military 
History:1949), hereafter, Miller, Guadalcanal. 
16 For more detailed accounts of the action on and around Guadalcanal see Richard B. Frank, 
Guadalcanal, (New York: Random House, 1990). Samuel Elliot Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, 
August 1942- February 1943, (Boston: Little Brown, 1949).   
 17 Morton, Strategy, 311-323. 
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Japanese bases in the Solomon Islands, New Ireland, New Britain, and Rabaul were self 
supporting and that the capture of the Admiralty Islands would not reduce the fighting 
strength of the Japanese. Capturing the Admiralty Islands before the Solomon Islands 
would expose the Allies to attacks on their flanks and give the Japanese the ability to 
attack the lines of communication with the Admiralty Islands.18
 Allied leaders met at Casablanca, Morocco in January 1943 to plan military 
objectives world wide for the coming year. The agreed upon strategy for the Pacific was 
to maintain pressure on Japanese forces and to capture Rabaul. The Pacific theater was 
considered the secondary offensive. Men and material would only be made available 
once the needs of the European area had been met. Once Germany surrendered, the Allies 
would concentrate their forces for an all out attack against the Japanese.19
 The Japanese suffered a major set back in their plans to secure New Guinea when 
the American 5th Air Force attacked a convoy of eight troop ships transports and a 
destroyer escort headed for Lae on 2-4 March 1943. In the resulting battle of the 
Bismarck Sea, the convoy was attacked by planes and Motor Patrol Torpedo boats (PT 
boats) for three days. All the Japanese transports and four destroyers were sunk for a loss 
of five aircraft. Out of almost 7,000 Japanese troops of the Japanese Army’s 51st Division 
aboard the transports nearly half were lost. 20
 
Allied Plans in the Pacific 
 In March 1943 the commanders in the Pacific sent their representatives to 
Washington D.C. for a series of conferences referred to as the Pacific Military 
Conference. Major General Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, presented 
a five stage plan, ELKTON II, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. First, airfields on the southeast 
coast of New Guinea would be taken to provide support for further advances. Second, the 
Solomon Island airfields had to be taken, especially Munda Point on New Georgia. Third, 
airfields on New Britain and Bougainville were needed to support future operations. 
Fourth, the airfields around Kavieng on New Ireland would be taken to isolate Rabaul 
                                                 
 18 Morton, Strategy, 364-375. 
 19 Miller, Cartwheel, 7-8. 
 20 Samuel Eliot Morison, Breaking the Bismark Barrier, 22 July 1942-1 May 1944 (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1950), 54-65, hereafter, Morison, Breaking the Bismark Barrier. 
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fully. Last, Rabaul itself would be occupied. The last two operations, it was agreed, might 
be switched in order. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the plan was too ambitious 
for the resources allocated for the Pacific. The Pacific representatives immediately 
responded with a reduced plan of only the first three objectives with the addition of 
establishing two airfields at Woodlark and Kiriwina islands. These plans would result in a 
two pronged attack. One prong would advance northwest through the Solomons while to 
the west another prong would advance along the east coast of New Guinea. A total of 
thirteen separate operations would take place during 1943. Each operation would be 
supported by operations of the other prong in coordinated moves always under cover of 
Allied fighter aircraft. The result would be the elimination of threats to Australia and the 
Allied lines of communication. The code name for the resulting operation was 
CARTWHEEL.21
 Cartwheel was a series of campaigns in the advance on Rabaul. The first landings 
took place on 21 June 1943 when part of a Marine Raider Battalion landed at Segi Point 
on the island of New Georgia in the central Solomon Islands. Ten days later on 30 June a 
combined force of Army and Marine troops landed on Vangunu Island just south of New 
Georgia to secure the Wickham Anchorage, while another force landed on Rendova 
Island to the west of New Georgia. Landings continued with Allied troops going ashore 
in a two pronged attack to capture the airfields around Munda on northern New Georgia. 
Other islands were captured that strengthened the Allied positions. To the west as part of 
Cartwheel, landings took place on 30 June 1943 with the invasion of Woodlark off the 
eastern coast of Papua New Guinea in the Solomon Sea. In September Allied troops 
landed near Lae on the eastern coast of Papua New Guinea. The advance up the Solomon 
Islands continued with landings on Bougainville on 1 November. In December landings 
were made on New Britain to secure Cape Gloucester. By the end of 1943 the Allied 
forces “dominated the skies all the way to Rabaul, and Allied ships sailed the Solomon 
Sea and the Huon Gulf in comparative safety”.22 Japanese forces at Rabaul were isolated, 
but the Allies still needed a harbor and air fields for the future attacks against the 
                                                 
 21 Miller, Cartwheel, 9-26. See also Morton, Strategy, 387-401. 
 22 Miller, Cartwheel, 272.  
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Philippine Islands. Because the decision had been made to by-pass Rabaul, which was 
strongly defended, the Admiralty Islands were substituted. 
 The start of the by-pass of Rabaul began with attacks from the air. The first major 
missions to attack the Japanese facilities around Rabaul began late in October 1943 with 
the 5th Air Force. The 5th Air Force continued to attack the area around Rabaul with some 
success throughout October and continued until mid November. On 17 December 1943 a 
combined force of U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and New Zealand fighters struck at Rabaul. 
This was the beginning of the complete destruction of Rabaul as an effective air base. By 
21 February 1944, according to U.S. intelligence estimates, Rabaul had ceased to be an 
effective Japanese air base and was left alone to sit out the war as just another by-passed 
fortress.23
 
                                                 
 23 Ronnie Day, “COMAIRSOLS Against Rabaul: The Last Air Battle of the South Pacific 
Theater” (paper presented at the Society for Military History meeting with the Ohio Valley History 
Conference, Western Kentucky University, Oct. 2001). 
 17
 CHAPTER 2 
THE INVASION OF LOS NEGROS 
 
 General Douglas MacArthur’s plan for a return to the Philippines called for a 
“base near enough for staging purposes and with a harbor of sufficient size to 
accommodate a large amphibious striking force. At the same time I [he] wished to insure 
the protection of my right flank, and to prevent reinforcements from reaching enemy 
troops bottled up in the Bismark-Solomons areas.”24 The decision not to take the harbor 
and airfields at Rabaul made the Admiralty Islands the logical alternative for future 
invasions.   
 
The Initial Phase 
 The attack against the Admiralties began from the air. The first missions flown 
against them were scheduled in early January, 1944. On 6 January the 90th Bomb Group 
(H) of the 5th Air Force bombed Momote airfield on Los Negros, cratering the runway 
and dispersal area. The first reconnaissance missions were flown by the 8th Photo 
Reconnaissance Squadron on 22 January. The bombing and strafing started the same day 
with an attack against shipping in the harbor by eleven B-25s from the 345th 
Bombardment Group out of Dododura, escorted by P-38s. The bombers hit a variety of 
targets on Manus and Los Negros, destroying an ammunition dump, a house, and various 
shipping. The bombers dropped thirty-seven tons of 1,000 pound bombs and during their 
strafing runs expended more than 25,000 rounds of machine gun ammunition. The P-38s, 
in their strafing runs expended 127,000 rounds of 20mm and .50 cal ammunition. On 24 
January thirty-eight B-25s from the 345th Bomb Group hit shipping targets in Seeadler 
Harbor and Momote airfield expending thirty-seven tons of bombs. During strafing runs 
against the airfield and shipping the B-25s expended nearly 100,000 rounds of .50 cal 
ammunition, reportedly destroying the last enemy planes reported on Momote. The 345th 
and 38th Bomb Groups hit again on 25 January with fifty-nine B-25s striking Momote 
                                                 
 24 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 187, hereafter, 
MacArthur, Reminiscences. Also see Morton, Strategy, 370-375. 
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and Manus. The planes arrived in four waves between 1125 and 1205, dropping 259 five 
hundred pound bombs and during their strafing runs firing almost 145,000 rounds of 
machine gun ammunition. Three planes were lost to antiaircraft fire, ending B-25 low 
level attacks until 13 February. On 26 January forty-one B-24s from the 90th and 43rd 
Bomb Groups, escorted by three squadrons of P-38s, bombed Momote dropping over 114 
tons of bombs, mainly 500 pounders. The next day, forty-one B-24s bombed the town of 
Lorengau and the airfield there dropping over 120 tons of 500 and 1,000 pound bombs.25
  With both airfields out of service the islands were not bombed again until 6 
February when the 43rd Bomb Group hit them with twenty-four B-24s with an escort of 
twenty-four P-38s. Bad weather and other operations kept the 5th Air Force away until 13 
February when the 38th and 345th Bomb Groups returned with eighty-two B-25s dropping 
95.5 tons on Momote airfield. The same groups returned the next day dropping eighty-
nine tons of 500 and 1,000 pound bombs on Momote. B-24s and B-25s returned to the 
Admiralty Islands every day until the landing, attacking both airfields and other targets of 
opportunity and dropping a total of 270 tons of 1,000, 500, and 100 pound bombs.26
 The 17th Reconnaissance Squadron sent three B-25s over Manus and Los Negros 
on 23 February. The B-25s spent ninety minutes over the islands flying as low as twenty 
feet and not receiving any enemy fire. The pilots reported, “Bombers over Manus report 
nil signs enemy. Crews say Los Negros and Manus are evacuated.” 27  The islands 
appeared deserted and the airfields overgrown. This mission set into motion the new time 
table for the invasion of the Admiralty Islands.28
 
 
 
                                                 
 25 Craven and Cate, Guadalcanal to Saipan, 558. See also 90th Bombardment Group History 
Operational Narrative, GP-90-HI 1 Jan 44 – 31 Aug 44, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell 
A.F.B., hereafter, AFHRC. Also in Warren, Fifth Air Force, 94. Craven and Cate in Guadalcanal to Saipan  
states 42 on 27 Jan while Warren in the Fifth Air Force states 41 reached the target. 
 26 Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces 558-9. Also Warren, Fifth Air Force Combat History, 96 and 
Appendix 8, 190-2.  
 27 1CD Message In Log, 26 Feb 44 for radio message, RG 407, National Archives and Records 
Administration, hereafter, NARA. Also see MacArthur, Reminiscences,188. 
 28 Miller, Cartwheel, 316. Daniel E. Barbey, MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy, (Annapolis: United 
States Naval Institute, 1969), 148, hereafter, Barbey, Navy. Craven and Cate, Guadalcanal to Saipan, 558. 
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The Invasion Date is Changed 
 With this new intelligence, General George C. Kenny, commander of the 5th Air 
Force, went to see MacArthur. On 26 February, MacArthur approved the plan to occupy 
the Admiralty Islands with an invasion date of 29 February instead of 1 April. “The 
situation presented an ideal opportunity for a coup de main which, if successful, could 
advance the Allied timetable in the Pacific by several months and save thousands of 
Allied lives.”29 Between the new intelligence and the planned invasion date more 
missions to soften up the islands were scheduled. On 24 February twenty-four B-24s and 
twenty-seven B-25s set out for the islands, but because of bad weather only three B-24s 
managed to get to the target. Nine B-25s of the 405th Bomb Group hit the islands on 25 
February.30
 This change in the time table caused the invading forces to plan and execute a 
movement of men and material over 500 miles in less than four days. The major problem 
was that transportation was unavailable to move the entire First Cavalry Division to Los 
Negros as scheduled.  
 
The Japanese Defense 
 Until December 1943 the Admiralties had been garrisoned by the 51st 
Transportation Regiment under the command of Colonel Yoshio Ezaki. In December, 
with Rabaul receiving increasing Allied attacks, the Japanese sent elements of the 14th 
Naval Base Force to the Admiralties which consisted of the 36th Air (AA) Defense Unit, 
the 88th Naval Guard Unit, 1st Field Hospital, 51st Division, and various other support 
troops and replacements. To further strengthen the area two more infantry battalions were 
needed. The 2d Battalion of the 1st Independent Mixed Regiment arrived from Kavieng 
by 25 January and by the end of the month the 1st Battalion, 229th Infantry, 38th Division 
had also arrived.  The total number of defending Japanese was estimated at between 
4,650 and 4,970. Ezaki assumed command of all Japanese forces in the islands and 
prepared to defend the harbor and airfields. What the Allies did not know was that Ezaki 
                                                                                                                                                 
See also 90th Bombardment Group History Operational Narrative February 1944 GP-90-HI 1 Jan 44 – 31 
Aug 44 AFHRC. And Warren, Fifth Air Force, 101. 
 29 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 188. 
 30 Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, 559. Warren, Fifth Air Force Combat History, 102. 
 20
had ordered his troops to not fire at aircraft flying over the islands and to stay out of sight 
during the day. Far from being abandoned, in fact the islands held nearly five thousand 
defenders.31   
 
The Allied Invasion Force 
 The Allied unit selected for the invasion was the newly arrived First Cavalry 
Division under the command of Major General Innis Swift.32 In July 1943 the division 
arrived at Strathpine, Australia. Acting as an infantry division, the men of the division 
spent their time training in jungle warfare and were as prepared as any other unit fresh to 
the Pacific theater. The division was organized as a “square” division having two 
brigades, 1st and 2nd, and the division artillery. Each brigade was assigned two cavalry 
regiments: 1st Brigade had the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments and the 2nd Brigade had the 
7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments. Each regiment had two squadrons, equivalent to a 
battalion, with additional units of headquarters, service, and weapons troops (a troop was 
the equivalent of a company). Each squadron was assigned three rifle troops, or 
companies, with a headquarters and a weapons troop. The division artillery had a 
headquarters battery and two battalions of 75mm howitzers and two battalions of 105mm 
howitzers.  The First Cavalry Division and its support units were designated Task Force 
Brewer for the invasion of the Admiralties. The landing would be made at Hyane Harbor 
on Los Negros, near Momote airfield. 33  
 Orders for the invasion of a “Reconnaissance in Force” of the Admiralties were 
also issued. This force which consisted of the 2nd Squadron of the 5th Cavalry Regiment, a 
platoon of the 99th Field Artillery Battalion, the 673rd Antiaircraft Machine Gun Battery, 
and liaison parties for coordination of naval and air support under the command of 
Brigadier General William C. Chase began to move from Oro Bay, Cape Sudest, New 
                                                 
 31 Field Order #3 Brewer Task Force 5 March 1944, Enemy Order of Battle, RG 407, NARA. For 
the Japanese records see Senshi Sosho, vol.96, . March 1976, translated by Hitomi Kinuhata. Miller. 
Cartwheel, 319. 
 32 Wright, B.C., The First Cavalry Division in World War Two, (Tokyo: Toppan Printing 
Company,  1947), 3, hereafter, Wright, First Cavalry. The First Cavalry Division was comprised of 
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during World War One. The division traded in their horses for trucks and tanks in 1921 at Fort Bliss, 
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 33 Miller, Cartwheel, 322. 
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Guinea on Seventh Amphibious Fleet ships that formed Task Force 76, a mixture of US 
and Royal Australian Navy ships. The light cruiser Phoenix would serve as MacArthur’s 
flagship during the invasion so that he could take active control if necessary and be in 
position to observe first hand the progress of the invasion. If the landing was 
unsuccessful, then MacArthur could call for the immediate withdrawal of the troops and 
not have to second guess the decision of a subordinate. If the invasion was a success, then 
he could make the decision to hold until the rest of the division could be brought to the 
islands.34
 The first assault wave was transported in three APDs, World War One destroyers 
converted to carry troops, and nine destroyers, using the ships’ boats as the transport to 
the beach. The follow-on units were to be transported in six LSTs that would depart from 
Cape Cretin about 2200 on D-Day. If the landing force encountered more opposition than 
it was able to deal with, it would form up on the outer side of Jamandilai Point south of 
Hyane Harbor and be evacuated with the boats from the APDs. 35  
 As stated in the Task Group 76, Task Force Brewer After Action report, the idea 
of withdrawing the troops in case of a strongly opposed landing was pure fantasy. “If 
evacuation became necessary, it is doubtful if many of these boats would have survived 
the enemy opposition that forced the evacuation. . . . it is probable that most of the 
landing force would have been lost.”36 
 
                                                 
 34 This is from Miller, Cartwheel, 321-6; Morison, Breaking the Bismark Barrier,432-7.  
 35 TF 76 Op Plan 2-44, 3, RG 407, NARA. 
 36 Task Force Brewer After Action Report, 1st Cavalry Division G-3 Plans, RG 407, NARA. RG 
38 also has a copy of TF 76 Op Plan, TF 76.1 Action Report, para 6, p 3. Also see TF 76 Op Plan 2-44, 2. 
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Figure 2. Detail of Hayne Harbor. Drawn from the First Cavalry Division Historical 
Report, map 6, RG 407, NARA. 
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The Allies Land 
 An advance party, a small patrol of Alamo Scouts, was dropped off by a PBY, at 
0645 on the morning of 27 February near Los Negros’ south shore under the cover of a 
two plane B-24 raid dropping 20 pound fragmentation bombs and 100 pound general 
purpose bombs, along with empty bottles for added noise. The Alamo Scouts reported 
back that night, “Unable to cross river, north bank lousy with Japs.”37 Kenny’s 
intelligence staff felt that the scouts might be exaggerating the force opposing them as 
any enemy at night might seem to be a large force. It was this report that caused 
Macarthur to accompany the invasion force. The Alamo Scouts were pulled off Los 
Negros by PBY at first light on 28 February under cover of a single B-24 escorted by two 
P-38s. 38
 Chase’s “Reconnaissance in Force” departed Oro Bay at 1800 on 27 February 
1944. The same day the follow-on units, 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment loaded onto 
3 LSTs at Oro Bay and departed on the same day for the invasion. The only problem 
encountered was that one LST was unable to get off the beach by 2000. This force 
departed Oro Bay for the Admiralties at 0400 29 February 44. 39
 The “Reconnaissance in Force” landing started with a “devastating bombardment 
from sea and air”.40 The flagship Phoenix, the cruiser Nashville and four destroyers, 
Daly, Hutchins, Beale, and Bache, supplied the naval bombardment while seven B-24s 
hit Momote airfield as the troops landed.  At 0800 on 29 February, in a pouring rain, the 
2nd Squadron of the 5th Cavalry Regiment of the First Cavalry Division landed along with 
the attached units. The invasion launched in four waves and was met by fire from an 
emplaced 25mm gun located on Jamandalai Point. The first three waves were unscathed 
by this gun, but the fourth wave began to receive accurate fire before the supporting 
destroyers and a covering B-25 targeted the enemy 25mm gun and silenced it. At first, 
the landing was essentially unopposed and the troops got ashore with minimal casualties. 
By 0950 the entire Momote airfield was declared secure. The landing forces continued to 
advance under light opposition. Patrols were sent out to the north reaching the Native 
                                                 
 371st Cavalry Division In Messages File, 2400 27 Feb. 1944, RG 407, NARA.  
 38 Miller, Cartwheel, 322. Also see Warren, Fifth Air Force Combat History, 104. 
 39 G-3 Operations report, 27,28 Feb. 44, RG 407, NARA. Wright in First Cavalry gives Cape 
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Skidway connecting Hayne Harbor with Seeadler Harbor, to the west reaching Porlaka, 
and to the south reaching a Japanese encampment about one mile away. That afternoon 
MacArthur came ashore and ordered General Chase to “Hold what you have taken, no 
matter against what odds. You have your teeth in him now, don’t let go”.41
 
The Japanese Response 
 The Japanese forces under Colonel Ezaki expected any Allied landing to take 
place on the opposite shore of the island and believed that the initial landing was a 
diversion. The slow reaction to the initial landing allowed the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry 
to consolidate its position around Momote airfield on Los Negros. The reported casualties 
from the landing forces were one Killed in Action (KIA) four Wounded in Action (WIA) 
and five known enemy dead. As night fell, the Brewer Task Force consolidated their 
positions to the harbor side of the runway and by using the aircraft revetments the 2nd 
Squadron, 5th Cavalry was able to construct a defendable position with minimum effort.42
 During the night of 29 February - 1 March the Japanese constantly infiltrated the 
5th Cavalry’s positions. They crept silently up to the defenders positions, attacked with 
grenades, and advanced into the defenders positions and fought desperate hand to hand 
fights.  The constant infiltrations and noise kept the troopers alert. Anything that moved 
was a target in the near pitch darkness. The Task Force wounded had to lie in their 
foxholes until light when it was safe to move about and then they were then taken to a 
former Japanese bunker along the shore that had been set up as a field station. There the 
1st Medical Squadron detachment treated the wounded on captured Japanese mess tables 
under gas lantern light.  In the brutal, bloody fighting the Japanese managed to reach as 
far as some command posts. Two Japanese soldiers got as close as fifteen feet from 
General Chase’s position before they were cut down by the Task Force intelligence 
officer (S-2) with a Thompson sub-machine gun. The Allied forces were able to repulse 
                                                                                                                                                 
 40 G-3 Historical Report, 2, RG 407, NARA. 
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the Japanese with a loss of seven KIA, twelve WIA, while the Japanese suffered sixty-
eight known dead.43
 On 1 March the Allies searched the perimeter for Japanese snipers that had gotten 
through the lines during the night. Snipers and infiltrators had cut the phone wires and 
were still in positions to fire at anyone who passed by. One group of Japanese occupied 
an unoccupied trench and bunker. They were not discovered until they fired on the 
Division Chaplain. The wounded Chaplain pointed to where the fire had come from so 
that soldiers with him could return fire. When some of the Japanese tried to escape they 
were cut down by the riflemen. The survivors retreated to the bunker and kept up 
sporadic fire until the bunker was blown up with them inside. While the 
“Reconnaissance” waited, patrols were sent out to try and estimate enemy positions and 
strengths. During the day supplies were dropped from B-25s and the “Yankee Diddler”, a 
B-17 from the 39th Troop Carrier Squadron. The “Yankee Diddler” alone dropped over 
three tons of plasma and ammunition to the troopers. At 1700 the Japanese attacked 
again, but after a fierce three-hour battle the main Japanese attack ended. Intermittent 
attacks continued throughout the night. The US forces suffered no casualties during the 
night attacks, while the known Japanese dead were fourteen. By the morning of 2 March, 
Japanese snipers were still inside the American lines.44
 
Allied Advances 
 The first order of business on the morning of 2 March was to eliminate the 
remaining snipers. As the troopers cleared out the Japanese that had gotten into the 
perimeter the “Yankee Diddler” returned with another load of plasma and ammunition. 
At 0900 the first reinforcements, the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry and the 40th Naval 
Construction Battalion (Seabees) arrived at Hayne Harbor aboard six of Task Force 76’s 
LSTs. The LSTs were met by fire from the Japanese gun on Lobortutu Point and 
scattered mortar fire. During the landing, eleven B-25s from the 38th Bombardment 
Group (M), strafed and bombed Japanese positions in front of the American lines. By 
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0945 the LSTs beached inside the harbor and began unloading troops and equipment. Part 
of the equipment on board the LSTs was the remaining guns of the 99th Field Artillery. 
They brought with them “only fifty seven [sic] vehicles” and three batteries of artillery 
consisting of 75 millimeter, (mm) pack howitzers.45 The 40th Seabees also landed with its 
construction equipment and immediately put the bulldozers to work reinforcing fighting 
positions and burying the enemy dead. The initial force was relieved to see the remainder 
of the 5th Cavalry arrive and quickly put them to work clearing out snipers threatening the 
perimeter. Except for the soldiers unloading the LSTs the incoming soldiers of the 1st 
Squadron, 5th Cavalry troops went straight into combat, defending the secured positions 
already occupied and eliminating Japanese troops that had continued to  infiltrate 
throughout the night. B-17s of the 69th Troop Carrier Squadron returned late in the 
morning, dropping more ammunition and plasma.46
 The newly arrived members of the 5th Cavalry were immediately issued orders for 
an attack at 1500 to secure all of Momote airfield. At 1415, P-47s and B-25s, 38th and 
345th Bombardment Groups, began bombing and strafing Japanese positions. 
Unfortunately, due to radio trouble, three bombs landed on the eastern side of the airfield, 
killing two men and wounding four members of E Troop 5th Cavalry and damaging a gun 
position of the 673rd Antiaircraft Machine Gun Battery. The attack at 1500 was supported 
by sixteen A-20s of the 13th and 90th Bombardment Squadrons (L), eight P-47s of the 
340th Fighter Squadron, and sixteen P-38s of the 433rd Fighter Squadron. By 1800 both 
cavalry squadrons and their attached units occupied the entire airfield and were digging 
in for the night. Ammunition for the Task Force was in short supply and was dropped 
throughout the day by B-17s. 47
 With the position secure, Chase requested that reinforcements be sent as soon as 
possible. He knew that the battle was still in doubt. He requested “ADDITIONAL 
REGIMENT TO COPE WITH INCREASING ENEMY RESISTANCE ESTIMATED 
AS TWO BNS [battalions] RPT BNS . . . MOVE A MINIMUM OF ONE TWO FIVE 
NAUGHT [1,250] MEN CMA [,] INCLUDING ARTILLERY CMA [,] SO AS TO 
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ARRIVE STENOGRAPHER [Hayne Harbor] BY EARLY FOUR MARCH”.48  The 
reinforcements would proceed in two groups. 
 The night of 2-3 March was very much like the other nights, the Japanese 
attacked in several small groups with heavy mortar fire and grenades and suffered heavily 
for it. The majority of attacks were directed against the northern half of the perimeter 
close to the Native Skidway. The Japanese lost four hundred known dead to American 
losses of seventeen KIA and thirty-six WIA. In the morning the lines of communication 
had to be repaired and the remaining infiltrating Japanese cleared out.49
 During the day of 3 March the Task Force was congratulated on the 89th 
anniversary of the establishment of the 5th Cavalry by a message dropped by the Division 
Commander, Major General Swift, from a B-17 flying over the island. The 40th Seabees 
began the task of clearing the airfield, making it suitable for use. The remainder of the 
forces prepared for an offensive attack at 1200. The attack was preceded by artillery fire 
from the 99th Field Artillery Battalion and went smoothly. Shortly after, the task force 
controlled all of the airfield and Jamandalai point. Movement during the day was easy 
and unopposed for the troops.  
 
Heavy Night Fighting 
 The night of 3-4 March saw the heaviest fighting yet. It was evident that the 
Japanese Commander, Colonel Ezaki, realized that he was facing the only landing in his 
area and that he had to defend the airstrip and harbor to the best of his ability. The 
Japanese started attacking shortly after nightfall. Most attacks were made by platoon 
sized elements and did not appear to be well coordinated. Units of Japanese “tried every 
trick in the book to confuse our troops and cause them to disclose their positions.”50
 The first indication of an attack was the sighting of four Japanese troop-carrying 
barges at 1600 approaching from the north west. The barges were fired upon by the 99th 
Field Artillery using 75mm pack howitzers and anti-aircraft guns. All the barges were 
destroyed and the troops were last seen swimming for the area of the Native Skidway. 
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Other Japanese field artillery pieces were spotted near the Native Skidway and fired upon 
by American artillery and naval fire.51
 Shortly after dark, about 2100, the Japanese attacked the American positions. In 
the 1st Squadron area the Japanese infiltrated small groups and individuals through the 
lines and set up sniping positions from which they would open fire at dawn. The attacks 
continued throughout the night with the fiercest occurring at dawn on the northern sector 
near the taxiway and the Porlaka Road. The Japanese concentrated the majority of their 
forces on the northern end of the 1st Squadron perimeter. The Japanese walked down the 
road singing and yelling to each other. The American forces opened up with concentrated 
light machine gun fire, cutting down whole squads. The best use of the machine guns was 
to remove them from their tripods and fire them standing or kneeling. The machine guns 
soon ran out of ammunition and the crews resorted to their individual weapons. 52
 The 2nd Squadron was attacked by a battalion plus of Japanese moving from the 
Native Skidway. Attempting to take the positions held by the 5th Cavalry Regiment and 
occupy them, the Japanese cut all lines of communication. The defenders had to resort to 
yelling out instructions, which was of minimum effect in the confusion of battle. The 
troops were instructed to stay in their individual fighting positions and fire at anything 
that moved. This proved to be the best defense possible.53
 The 40th Seabees were positioned on the northern end of the perimeter and came 
under heavy attack during the night. With their assistance the defending troops were able 
to maintain the perimeter. According to the 1st Cavalry Division Historical report the 40th 
Seabees “saved the day with their defense”.54
 Around midnight, “all hell broke loose” along the perimeter when the Japanese 
attacked in strength.55 It seemed to the defenders that there was no coordinated attack 
plan. The Japanese swarmed in head-on attacks with no regard for casualties. The only 
plan was to drive the Americans into the sea. A few of the defending troops were forced 
to withdraw in several locations when their positions were in danger of being overrun but 
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the majority held their positions until morning. As one soldier put it, “where the hell are 
you going to go to?”.56  
 An indication of the intensity of the fighting is given in the citation of the only 
Congressional Medal of Honor awarded during the campaign.  
 During the night Sgt. Troy A. McGill of G Troop and his 8 man squad were 
 holding a revetment. “At about 0400, more than 200 drink-crazed fanatics loomed 
 out of the underbrush recklessly screaming threats and curses. As the attack 
 progressed all of Sergeant McGill’s men were either killed or wounded except 
 one whom he ordered to drop back to the safety of the next revetment. Sergeant 
 McGill remained in his position and kept mowing down the enemy until his 
 weapon would fire no more. By this time the Japanese had reached a point about 
 five yards from his bunker. With utter disregard for his personal safety and 
 knowing that he faced certain death, he left his foxhole and using his rifle as a 
 club engaged in hand-to-hand combat until he was killed by the enemy. After 
 daylight, 105 enemy dead were found in front of and within the area occupied by 
 the 1st  Platoon of Troop “G”, the platoon of which Sergeant McGill’s squad was 
 the defensive spearhead. Sergeant McGill’s courageous and determined stand, his 
 spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion to duty were a source of inspiration to his 
 comrades and contributed greatly toward breaking the frenzied attack.”57 For his  
 stand in the defense McGill was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.58
 
 On the morning of 4 March the American troops got to work clearing out the 
infiltrators and snipers from the perimeter. Many positions had Japanese dead piled 
around them. One heavy machine gun position had sixty-eight dead in front of it in the 
morning. The total known enemy dead were one thousand in the area of the Skidway and 
another four hundred along the road to Porlaka. Some of what appeared to be enemy dead 
were actually alive waiting for the chance to kill members of the defending force. The 
American losses for the night were forty-eight killed, ninety-two wounded.59
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Figure 3. Detail of Los Negros. Adapted from First Cavalry Division Historical Report, 
R.G. 407, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD.
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Reinforcements Arrive
 On the morning of 4 March the 2nd Squadron of the 7th Cavalry Regiment and the 
82nd Field Artillery Battalion landed along with their 75mm pack howitzers. The 
remainder of the day was spent clearing away the enemy dead and preparing for more 
attacks. The night of 4/5 March was the quietest night so far with no attacks.60
 The Division Commander, Major General Innis Swift, arrived on the morning of 5 
March aboard the destroyer Bush. The Bush spent the day firing on enemy positions and 
did not off load Swift until 1600. At 1200 the newly arrived 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry 
received warning orders to “move North on the MOKERANG PENINSULA, via the 
SKIDWAY, thence West to RED BEACH [on the Seeadler Harbor side] in the SALAMI 
PLANTATION area, and secure a beachhead to protect the landing of the 2nd 
B.C.T.[Brigade Combat Team, consisting of the 8th Cavalry and 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry 
and supporting units]”61 The 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry moved out at 1500 but only 
progressed 500 yards up the Native Skidway. The Squadron dug in for the night and 
fought off scattered groups of Japanese attempting to infiltrate the American position. 
The number of Japanese killed that night is impossible to estimate as the area already had 
enemy dead lying around.62  
 During the morning of 6 March the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry moved north 
towards Salami Plantation. That morning also saw the arrival of the 12th Cavalry at 
Hayne Harbor aboard four LSTs. On board the LSTs were four light tanks of the 603d 
Tank Company, five LVTs of A Company, 592nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, the 
105mm howitzers of the 271st Field Artillery Battalion, and two L-4 Liaison Planes. The 
route north was a sea of mud that only got deeper as the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry troops 
and their vehicles moved along it. The retreating Japanese had cut down trees along the 
road as barriers to delay the advance. The going was slow and muddy, but unopposed. 
The only vehicles that were able to move unaided were the tanks and LVTs, also known 
as buffalos. By 1600 the Salami Plantation and Red Beach were in American hands. The 
troops found “large amounts of enemy supplies . . . including five trucks; abandoned 
buildings containing radios, drafting equipment, charts, food and propaganda 
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pamphlets.”63 Now future landings would not have to be made in Hayne Harbor. The 5th 
Cavalry advanced west towards Porlaka and occupied the enemy positions there. The first 
aircraft to land on Momote airfield was a B-25 that arrived at 1330. The night was quiet 
for the defenders except for the usual harassing rifle fire and grenade throwing.64
 On 7 March the 12th Cavalry sent 2 squads with three tanks to Mokerang Point. 
The 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment sent out small patrols that killed three Japanese 
and two Indians. The regiment was resupplied during the day with ammunition, rations, 
and blood plasma by B-24 aircraft. LCVs were loaded with ammunition and rations at 
Momote and proceeded to Salami by way of Ndrilo Island, arriving at 0800 on 8 March. 
The main activity of the day was two separate landings on different parts of Los 
Negros.65
 A platoon of B Troop of the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry moved from their positions 
at Momote airfield to Porlaka and assaulted Papitalai by “Canvas pneumatic boats, rubber 
boats and engineer assault boats . . .  (additionally) one Jap barge . . . was captured and 
placed in use”.66  They were met by “stiff opposition on the beach but were able to 
establish and hold a beachhead until they were relieved.”67  
  From the positions at the north end of Los Negros a platoon, twenty men, of the 
12th Cavalry departed Salami in two LVTs (buffalos) and crossed the entrance to 
Papitalai Harbor to Papitalai Mission. They were met by “entrenched Japs” defending the 
Papitalai Mission with mortars, machine guns, rifles, and a 75mm howitzer.68 The first 
platoon across “held alone during the 45 minutes necessary to land the subsequent 
wave.”69 The two LVTs shuttled men and equipment until the third wave, when a third 
LVT came up from Momote and assisted in the shuttle operation. The Japanese 
counterattacked the landing with thirty men and were defeated. By 1930 the 2nd 
Squadron, 12th Cavalry minus two companies, had established a beachhead “50 yards 
                                                                                                                                                 
 62 Miller, Cartwheel, 336-7. 7th Cav Historical Report, 2, RG 407, NARA. 
 63 7th Cav Historical Report, 3, RG 407, NARA. G-3 Operations Report, dtd 7 March 44, RG 407, 
NARA. 
 64 Miller, Cartwheel, 338 and Div Arty Historical Report, 5, RG 407, NARA. 
 65 12th Cav Historical Report, 4 -5, RG 407, NARA. 
 66 5th Cav Historical Report, 7, RG 407, NARA. 
 67 G-3 Historical Report, 10, RG 407, NARA. 
 68 12th Cav Historical Report, 4, RG 407, NARA. 
 69 12th Cav Historical Report, 4, RG 407, NARA. 
 33
inland and 150 yards in width”.70 As the afternoon wore on the supply situation was 
becoming critical. The troops would soon be critically short of food, ammunition, and 
medical supplies. The buffalos were busy shuttling much needed troops to the beachhead 
and could not be used for supplies so the decision was made to use the recently arrived 
and assembled L-4’s to drop supplies to the beachhead. When night fell the shuttle 
operation was stopped because the coral reefs made further crossings impractical. During 
the night the Japanese defenders attempted to counterattack several times. Each time the 
271st Field Artillery Battalion fired at the enemy troop concentrations using 75mm and 
105mm howitzers emplaced at the south-east end of Momote airfield, sometimes hitting 
as close as fifty yards to the squadron’s positions, and broke up the attacks. The next 
morning the remainder of the 2nd Squadron, 12th Cavalry landed “without incident”.71 The 
only activity that night was the appearance of “Washing Machine Charlie” who dropped 
one bomb near the Momote airfield.72
 On 8 March two British Indians surrendered to the Americans. They identified 
themselves as part of the 511th Sikh Regiment that had been captured at Singapore and 
brought to the Admiralties only about a month earlier as labor troops. They also told the 
Americans that there were another sixty-nine Indians waiting to come in. One Sikh 
returned to the group and led them in. The group was fed and stayed in the regimental 
area until 9 March, when they left for Brewer Task Force Headquarters by LCVs.73  
 Just after noon on 8 March, orders were received notifying the 2nd Squadron, 7th 
Cavalry to move to Lombrum Plantation by LCMs and secure the beach near there. After 
a preparatory bombardment by the 271st Field Artillery Battalion and destroyers, the 
squadron landed on the beach at 1420 to a defense of light weapons, including some 
20mm fire. By 1430 the beach was secure and the Squadron advanced one hundred yards 
and established a perimeter. Patrols sent out from the perimeter encountered no resistance 
and found “abandoned gas, oil, and bomb dumps as well as one serviceable LMG [Light 
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Machine Gun] Cal 25.6 with abundant ammunition.”74 A fresh water well was also found 
which eliminated the need for water to be brought forward.  
 Before Seeadler Harbor could be used the Navy and Air Force shelled and 
bombed enemy positions defending the harbor. On 5 March the navy shelled suspected 
positions and did not receive any return fire. The following day the destroyer Nicholson 
entered the harbor and, as planned, drew fire from the defending Japanese. The Allied 
response was to shell and bomb the disclosed positions. On the 7th and 8th the positions 
were struck from the air again. Never again did the Japanese fire on ships entering the 
harbor.75
  Now that the harbor was secure, the Allies could land troops on Red Beach inside 
Seeadler Harbor near Salami. The 2d Brigade arrived at Red Beach on the morning of 9 
March. This force consisted of the majority of the 8th Cavalry; 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry; 
assorted divisional and nondivisional units of support troops; 61st Field Artillery 
Battalion; Battery B 168th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion; Battery B 211th Coast Artillery 
Battalion; Company F 592nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment; an Australian New 
Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) detachment; and a detachment of No. 62 Works 
Wing Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). The remainder of 9 March was spent 
unloading the incoming troops and getting them into position.76
 Now that the entire division had landed several separate operations would take 
place at the same time. In order for the reader to best follow the actions, they will be 
described as complete operations.  
 
Hill 260 
 Most of the division spent 10 and 11 March trying to locate the remaining enemy 
units and get a fix on their positions. The 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regimental 
Reconnaissance Platoon moved to Papitalai and continued southwest towards Hill 260 
and moved up the hill until they encountered enemy resistance. After a brief exchange of 
rifle and machine gun fire, the platoon retreated and requested artillery fire on the hill. 
The 271st Field Artillery Battalion fired 225 rounds at the positions. The platoon made 
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another attempt, but was stopped again. F Troop of the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry was 
tasked to send a reinforced platoon up the hill. At 1400 the 82d Field Artillery Battalion 
fired 1200 rounds on the hill. F Troop advanced up the hill until they were stopped and 
forced to withdraw to the regiment’s positions at Papitalai. At 1800 Division Artillery 
shelled the enemy positions.77
  At 0730 on the morning of the 11 March, Division Artillery began shelling the 
Japanese defenders of Hill 260. The 5th Cavalry sent a reinforced platoon equipped with 
two medium tanks, flame throwers, and bazookas and began to try to take Hill 260 again. 
The tanks bogged down just two hundred yards up the trail. Infantry had to be placed 
around the tanks to protect them from Japanese infiltrators. The bazookas and flame 
throwers were not able to keep up with the advancing infantry in the steep jungle terrain. 
The remaining infantry advanced up the hill until they were fired on by rifle and machine 
gun fire. The platoon had no choice but to retreat down the hill. They estimated that the 
position was held by at least a company of determined Japanese troops. The attacking 
forces used an extremely steep trail that was only wide enough for two men to walk 
abreast. Visibility was restricted to five to ten yards at all times. The Japanese forces 
were easily able to defend their positions.78  
 At 0730 on 12 March, after a barrage of mortar and artillery fire, F Troop of 2nd 
Squadron, 5th Cavalry started up Hill 260. They encountered heavy sniping and machine 
gun fire and returned to their camp. The Japanese were well dug in and seemed 
determined to hold Hill 260. The remainder of the day was spent patrolling around 
Porlaka and Papitalai, but no Japanese activity was noted in these areas. After a relatively 
quiet night, with only three enemy air raids directed against Momote airfield, the 5th 
Cavalry sent out patrols again on 13 March and prepared for a major assault against Hill 
260 with the entire squadron of the 5th Cavalry.79
 As planned in Field Order Number 4, there were four objectives to be taken as the 
regiment advanced up Hill 260 on 14 March.  Each objective was known to be a Japanese 
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strong point. A preparatory barrage of artillery and mortars began at 1030. A and B 
Troops of the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry advanced to their first objective with only light 
opposition. Once they reached their objective, they held up until the 76th RAAF Squadron 
struck Japanese positions ahead of them at 1245. At 1300 A and B Troops of the 1st 
Squadron, 5th Cavalry advanced under a coordinated artillery barrage toward the second 
objective. The troops moved forward using bazookas and rifle and machine gun fire to 
knock out pillboxes with eight pillboxes destroyed in this action. By 1440 the 1st 
Squadron had captured the Japanese pill boxes at the second objective and dug in for the 
night. Artillery fire and mortar was directed against the Japanese positions that formed 
the third objective every thirty minutes during the night. The Japanese counterattacked 
Troop A at 1555 and 2100, but they were driven off by fire from the troop and artillery 
fire from the 82 Field Artillery Battalion.80
 At 0730 on the morning of 15 March A and B Troops of the 1st Squadron 5th 
Cavalry advanced toward the third objective. “Having overcome sporadic resistance” 
they occupied the Japanese fox holes that formed the third objective by 1035.81 Patrols 
were sent out in the direction of the fourth objective, the top of Hill 260, and encountered 
only light enemy activity. At 1400 the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry dug in at the third 
objective and waited for night. During the day C Troop was busy bringing up water, 
rations, and ammunition to the remainder of the squadron. The round trip from Papitalai 
to the third objective took five hours over the one and a half mile “narrow, rutted and 
slippery trail. On return trips they evacuated the sick and wounded.”82 The 2nd Squadron, 
5th Cavalry conducted patrols departing from their positions around Momote airfield. E 
Troop moved west along the coastal trail toward the trail junction of Puwas and 
encountered strong organized resistance near the junction. In the brief encounter they 
killed four Japanese, ran off the other defenders, and captured a machine gun. The 
Regimental Reconnaissance Platoon moved from Momote airfield to the south and west 
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crossing Porharmenemen Creek. They encountered dense swamp and jungle as they 
advanced towards Lemondrol Creek but no enemy or trails.83
 On 16 March the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry held their positions on Hill 260 and 
spent the day with small patrols to their front and in re-supply operations. The 2nd 
Squadron, 5th Cavalry moved from their positions at Momote airfield toward the trail 
junction at Puwas. This squadron encountered strong resistance along the coastal trail that 
prevented them from advancing all the way to the trail junction. E Troop moved inland to 
bypass the resistance and was soon fired on by two heavy machine guns, forcing them to 
retreat. 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry estimated that they were facing at least a “heavily 
reinforced platoon.”84 The patrol returned to their positions at Southeast Point due to the 
difficulties of re-supply and the poor trail conditions.85
 The night was quiet for both squadrons. On the morning of 17 March C Troop of 
the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry launched an attack against Hill 260. B Troop moved off the 
trail to the north in an attempt to flank the Japanese defenders. They found the going in 
the dense jungle slow and made a great deal of noise cutting through the jungle. Hearing 
all the noise, the Japanese retreated from their positions and the fourth objective was 
taken by 1310. The squadron spent the remainder of the day digging in and trying to 
bring supplies forward to their positions. Two bulldozers were dispatched to Papitalai in 
an attempt to build a road up Hill 260. Both bulldozers became so bogged down that the 
attempt was stopped. A Troop sent a patrol south in an attempt to reach Lemondrol 
Creek. The patrol was unable to reach the creek in the impenetrable undergrowth.86
 
Clearing Los Negros 
 The 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry on the southern side of Los Negros sent F Troop 
towards Chapotup Point, about one and a half miles west of Southeast Point. F Troop 
spent the day building up an intermediary supply point for the regiment before the 
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scheduled move west along the coastal trail. The bulldozers sent to Southeast Point had 
an easier time of it and were able to accomplish the start of a corduroy road.87  
 The following days for the 5th Cavalry, in both locations, were spent consolidating 
positions and sending out patrols trying to locate enemy units. On 20 March the brigade 
commander, General Chase, issued the plans for the total occupation of Los Negros. The 
1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry would move from their positions near Hill 260 to the south west 
and link up with the 12th Cavalry that had been held in reserve at Papitalai Mission. The 
2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry would continue to move along the coastal trail and drive the 
defenders into the 1st Squadron and the 12th Cavalry.88  
 On the morning of 21 March the brigade moved out as ordered. The 2d Squadron, 
12th Cavalry moved southwest under a covering barrage of mortar and artillery fire at 
0830. They met resistance at 1115 and continued “doggedly pushing the attack against 
determined Jap resistance until nightfall.”89 That night a large group of Japanese tried to 
infiltrate the positions of B Troop. While the Japanese were on the trail B Troop waited 
“until the trail was well filled with Japs and then opened up with devastating effect.”90 
The surviving Japanese attempted to get through the perimeter all night but failed. The 
2nd Squadron, 12th Cavalry made no contact with the 5th Cavalry even though they were 
only 250 yards away in the dense jungle.  
 The 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry moved out under coordinated artillery and mortar 
fire and moved to the south west in an attempt to link up with 2nd Squadron, 12th 
Cavalry. They met heavy machine gun fire and retreated to their previous positions and 
called for concentrated fire on the Japanese positions. After an intense barrage, the 1st 
Squadron advanced again and “were again met with withering fire from the well 
concealed machine guns and rifles in the dense cane growths.”91 The 1st Squadron 
retreated to the positions they had held the previous night. The 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry 
continued to work on building up the supplies necessary for their push along the Coastal 
Trail. 
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 Surprisingly, there was very little enemy activity for the 5th Cavalry during the 
night. On 22 March the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry moved forward at 0900. They soon 
came under heavy fire and were not able to advance despite attempts to flank the 
Japanese positions. The squadron was forced to again withdraw to their previous 
positions. To the south, G Troop of the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry patrolled to Palapi Hill. 
E Troop patrolled toward Tauwi Hill. The only activity that either troop saw was when E 
Troop called in artillery fire on a Japanese mortar position on the eastern end of Palapi 
Hill. The 12th Cavalry continued to push south towards the 5th Cavalry. They were able to 
advance 800 yards through the small village of Juarez before they were forced to stop and 
dig in for the night. 92
 On 23 March the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry finally linked up with the 2d Squadron, 
12th Cavalry at 1130. The two units spent the day reorganizing and re-supplying. The 
wounded and sick of 2nd Squadron, 12th Cavalry were evacuated down the 5th Cavalry 
supply route. The 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry sent out patrols in preparation for the next 
days operations.93
 On 24 March A and C Troops of the 5th Cavalry along with E and F Troops of the 
12th Cavalry advanced again. The four troops were held up by machine guns in a small 
village. With the troops unable to advance the commander, Captain Greer, brought 
forward the heavy machine guns. He then instructed the men to wait until the machine 
guns could fire on the village, and then all four troops would move forward under the 
covering fire of the machine guns. When the machine guns opened up the troops moved 
forward firing with everything they had -- rifles, carbines, BAR’s, Thompsons, and light 
machine guns. This caught the Japanese by surprise and suppressed their fire, every 
defender died in the assault. The advance continued until 1400, when the four Troops dug 
in for the night. The 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry continued to patrol the Coastal Trail and 
continue the build up of supplies for their final push.94
 On 25 March the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry and the 2d Squadron, 12th Cavalry 
advanced against light resistance toward the trail between Chaporowan Point, on the 
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northern end of Los Negros, and Lolach Passage, on the south shore. All units had to hold 
their positions as the supply situation was becoming critical. It was impractical to 
continue to re-supply the 5th Cavalry up the trail over Hill 260. For the 12th Cavalry the 
re-supply started on the north shore of Los Negros, along a jeep trail towards 
Chaporowan Point. The terrain was steep and extremely rugged and very time 
consuming. Fortunately, water was not a problem. There were numerous creeks and pools 
that when used with Halazone tablets made the water safe to drink. This expedient cut 
down by a third the amount of supplies that had to be brought forward.  The 2d Squadron, 
5th Cavalry kept up its advance and continued construction of the Coastal Road. The road 
was to be used for re-supply once all the units reached the coast.95
 On 26 March the two squadrons of the 12th Cavalry met up on the southern shore 
of Los Negros. The two squadrons of the 5th Cavalry also managed to finally meet. The 
supply situation was solved with the use of the Coastal Road and by using boats from 
Hayne Harbor. Now that the brigade was back together the remaining Japanese could be 
cleared up.96
 The following morning, 27 March, the 5th Cavalry and 12th Cavalry sent out 
patrols looking for any remaining Japanese. From the evidence it seemed that any 
survivors had gone over to Manus Island. Except for a few scattered and starving 
Japanese, Los Negros was completely secured. The next few days were spent in 
patrolling and looking for Japanese survivors and intelligence gathering.97 
                                                                                                                                                 
 94 5th Cav Historical Report, 17, RG 407, NARA. And 12th Cav Historical Report, 15, RG 407, 
NARA. 
 95 5th Cav Historical Report, 17, RG 407, NARA. And 12 Cav Historical Report, 16, RG 407, 
NARA. 
 96 5th Cav Historical Report, 18, RG 407, NARA. And 12th Cav Historical Report, 16, RG 407, 
NARA. 
 97 5th Cav Historical Report, 18-19, RG 407, NARA. And 12th Cav Historical Report, 16, RG 407, 
NARA. 
 41
Figure 4. Detail of Manus Island. Adapted from First Cavalry Division Historical Report, 
map 9A, R.G. 407, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD.
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 CHAPTER 3 
THE ATTACK ON MANUS 
 
 While the Second Brigade was getting ready to attack Manus, the division 
artillery needed to be placed close enough to provide supporting fire for the landing. The 
outer islands of Hauwei and Butjo Luo would be ideal. 
 
Islands for the Artillery 
 On 11 March three patrols, each with twenty-four men, from the 302d Recon 
Troop and attached artillery left Salami at 0800, each patrol aboard an LCVP and a PT 
boat. One patrol reconnoitered Bear Point on Manus Island. They encountered no enemy 
resistance and returned at 1100. The second patrol reconnoitered Butjo Luo Island and 
found it deserted. They were safely back at Salami by 1130.  The third patrol totaling 
twenty-six men, with the addition of two ANGAU members, landed on Hauwei Island.98  
 The patrol moved inland about 150 yards where it was hit by enemy mortars, 
machine gun, and rifle fire. The patrol requested fire support from the PT boat. But after 
a few rounds the PT boat was fired on and the skipper wounded, so the PT boat returned 
to its tender.  The patrol had to fight its way back to the beach and after two and half 
hours finally managed to reach it. Five members of the patrol boarded an LCVP while the 
others gave covering fire. As the LCVP pulled off the beach it was hit by machine gun 
and mortar fire as it continued to pull away and hit a reef two hundred yards offshore. 
The Japanese attempted to set up a machine gun position to fire on the survivors but were 
fired on by patrol members still on shore. The patrol members on shore wisely retreated 
to the reef where the LCVP crew and the surviving patrol members were stranded under 
fire until 1400. At 1600 they were picked up by a PT boat while a destroyer shelled the 
island. Eight members of the patrol and two artillery men were killed in the engagement 
and all members of the patrol were wounded.99  
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 With the enemy’s presence confirmed, at 1415 on 12 March two reinforced troops 
from 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry landed on Hauwei Island from LCMs, after an artillery 
barrage from the 271st Field Artillery Battalion. Support for the landings came from naval 
fire from within Seeadler Harbor, rockets launched from LCMs, and the aircraft of the 
77th Pursuit Sqdn, RAAF. Troop E landed on West Beach and was met by rifle fire. 
Troop G landed on South Beach under machine gun fire from bunkers. The two troops 
moved inland until a line from north to south was established about three hundred yards 
inland. Both troops were pinned down by machine gun, mortar, and grenade fire. The 
remainder of the troop came ashore during the advance. The troop was unable to advance 
in the diminishing light and realized that they could not secure the entire island before 
night. The units pulled back into a defensive perimeter for the night but the Japanese did 
not attack. Losses for the day, were three killed and ten wounded.100
 At dawn on 13 March a machine gun burst wounded three troopers. At 0900 a 
tank arrived on the island for close fire support and at 1000 an attack was launched using 
Troops C, E, and G on a north south line across the island with the tank on the southern 
end. The tank was quickly put to good use in destroying a bunker holding two heavy 
machine guns, knee mortars, rifles, and eight defenders. The bunker took four mortar and 
four 75mm tank main gun hits to silence it. In the center of the island a short  
trench was encountered that held light machine guns, mortars, and riflemen. After a short 
sharp battle, the trench defenders were killed. By 1200 the island was secured at a cost of 
eight killed and forty-six wounded. Forty-two Japanese defenders were known killed. 
The 7th Cavalry settled in on the western end of the island where the men were able for 
the first time “to sleep above ground since its initial landing.”101
 Once the island had been cleared of opposition, the artillery battalions could move 
there. The 61st Field Artillery Battalion moved to Hauwei the afternoon of 13 March. The 
movement was slow due to a lack of over water transportation. The next day the 
remainder of the battalion arrived and set up their 105mm howitzers on the east end of 
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the island. The 271st Field Artillery Battalion moved to Hauwei Island on 14 March and 
set up their 105’s on the west end of the island.102
 
Landing on Manus 
 While the First Brigade, 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments, were clearing Los 
Negros, the Second Brigade consisting of the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments was tasked 
with clearing Manus. The 99th Field Artillery Battalion had landed on Butjo Luo Island 
on 13 March and had set up their 75mm howitzers. In addition, the 61st and 271st Field 
Artillery Battalions could also provide close fire support for the landings. The plan called 
for the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry to land on Yellow One Beach and drive eastward to 
Lorengau airfield and the 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry to follow on and drive inland in a 
flanking move to capture the town of Lorengau. The 7th Cavalry would land the same 
day, secure the beachhead, and act as brigade reserve.103
  A twelve-hour artillery barrage by the 99th, 27th, and 61st Field Artillery 
Battalions preceded the landings on 15 March. Six destroyers in Seeadler Harbor fired at 
targets on the landing beaches for one hour.104 Five minutes before the landing three 
Rocket LCVs launched their rockets at the beach and the RAAF 77th Fighter Wing 
provided air cover. At 0935 the buffalos carrying A Troop, 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry 
landed on Yellow 2 and was met by heavy machine gun fire that was quickly silenced by 
the LCMs and buffalos of the landing force. The troops got ashore with little further 
resistance and rushed inland to the Lugos Mission where they found several dazed 
Japanese who were killed before they could respond. All the pill boxes that still had 
defenders were quickly silenced by the first wave. Troop C landed on Yellow 1 also at 
0935 and quickly advanced to a ridge overlooking the landing beaches.  With the beaches 
secure, the remainder of the regiment landed without incident. The First Brigade reached 
its initial objective overlooking the beach without sustaining any casualties. The 1st 
Squadron, 7th Cavalry landed on Yellow 2 at 1315 and established a beachhead perimeter 
for the landing of the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry. Once both squadrons were ashore they 
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moved towards the positions of the 8th Cavalry near Lugos Mission, established a 
perimeter defense along the western flank, and waited in reserve. 105
 
Movement to Lorengau 
 The 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry began its’ advance down Number 3 Road along the 
coast towards Lorengau Airfield while the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry began its move 
inland on Number 1 Road. Troops A and B of the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry advanced 
down Number 3 Road meeting only light resistance from the numerous bunkers.  The 
squadron advanced nearly a mile before they came to a narrowing of the road. In front of 
them were three mutually supporting bunkers blocking the road. The lead troopers rushed 
the bunkers but were stopped before they could get into grenade range. The squadron 
commander, Major Shore, called for an artillery strike on the bunkers by the 105s of the 
271st Field Artillery Battalion. The fire was laid down within one hundred yards of the 
men and appeared to devastate the bunkers. The troopers, however, moved forward into 
an undiminished fire. The bunkers had only been scratched.106   
 Another artillery strike was called for, this time with the support of the 75mm 
howitzers of the 99th Field Artillery Battalion, 1st squadrons own organic 81mm mortars, 
the RAAF P-40’s, and an M-5 light tank. This time the bunkers were destroyed and the 
squadron could resume its advance toward the airfield. The squadron stopped on a ridge 
overlooking the airfield and dug in for the night. Except for intermittent sniper fire it was 
a quiet night. During the day a total of more than three hundred bunkers were captured or 
destroyed.107
 The 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry began its advance inland on a track that intersected 
Number 1 Road. The route was a mess of ridges, close jungle, and “nerve wracking 
sniper fire.”108 The squadron reached the intersection of the track and Number 1 Road 
about 1500 and found that it was well guarded by three bunkers and mortar positions in 
the jungle. The squadron dug in for the night about 600 yards from Number 1 Road. 
Artillery fire was directed against the bunkers and the suspected mortar positions. Except 
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for scattered sniper fire it was a quiet night and the squadron made plans for the morning 
attack.109
 On the morning of 16 March the Regimental Commander, Colonel Bradley, and 
the Brigade Commander, General Mudge, came forward to the 2nd Squadron, 8th 
Cavalry’s position. The 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry got off to an early start, overran the 
three delaying bunkers and proceeded down Number 1 Road towards Lorengau Town. 
The narrow road was protected by well camouflaged bunkers. By using “a combination 
of grenades and superior assault tactics on the part of the attacking troops, the bunkers 
were isolated and reduced.”110 After knocking out eight bunkers during the day the 
squadron stopped one thousand yards from Lorengau Town and dug in for the night.111
 Just after 0800 on 16 March a platoon from A Troop, 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry, 
moved out to clear a group of snipers on the north side of Lorengau air field before the 
regiment began its advance. The snipers kept the platoon busy until almost noon, 
delaying the advance of the regiment.  1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry advanced against 
Lorengau Airfield. Troop C moved inland towards the southern edge of the airfield but 
after just two hundred yards Troop C came under heavy machine gun fire. Troop C 
moved up the attached platoon of the Regimental Weapons Troop and directed them to 
fire their .50 cal machine guns and 81mm mortars on the positions. Under the diversion 
of the supporting fire, a flanking platoon from C Troop moved to the south and succeeded 
in destroying two bunkers and flushing the Japanese from their positions.112
 Once the snipers were cleared out and the flanks secure, the remainder of the 1st 
Squadron, 8th Cavalry assaulted the airfield in two moves. Troop A was told to cross the 
airfield and move east along the edge of the airfield. Troops B, D, and Headquarters 
Platoon were to move down the airfield. As the main body, B, D, HQ, moved down the 
airfield they came under heavy fire from a series of bunkers concealed along the south 
side of the airfield. B Troop in the lead got caught in the open and the men scrambled for 
any cover they could find and tried to fight to the east edge of the airfield where the other 
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troops had found cover. The remainder of the advance force retreated to the northern 
edge of the airfield.113
 The flanking platoon from C Troop was engaging the same position that was 
firing down the airfield and pinning down B Troop. With B Troop firing on the same 
positions from the opposite direction, the flanking platoon from C Troop was forced to 
withdraw. An artillery barrage was then ordered on the positions holding up the advance. 
After four hundred rounds were fired, Troop C advanced against the positions and 
immediately encountered such heavy fire from the bunkers that they had to withdraw. 
The squadron reformed on the north end of the airfield and prepared positions for the 
night. Because of the heavy resistance, the 7th Cavalry moved from brigade reserve to the 
airfield to assist in the attack the next morning.114
 The morning of 17 March brought a heavy concentration of fire against the 
Japanese positions around the airfield. Fire from the 271st  and 61st Field Artillery 
Battalions, destroyers off shore, 37mm anti-tank guns, and two light tanks practically 
eliminated Japanese resistance. The 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, supported by B Troop, 1st 
Squadron, 8th Cavalry attacked the airfield at 0900 and found only light resistance. The 
2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry swept to the south towards Lorengau meeting only scattered 
sniper fire. It then linked up with the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry and the two squadrons 
advanced towards Lorengau Township, reaching Lorengau River by 1500. A patrol was 
sent across the river and was met by fire from bunkers surrounding Lorengau Township. 
The patrol retreated back across the river and the 7th and 8th Cavalry regiments dug in for 
the night.115
 On 18 March the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry advanced into Lorengau Township. 
The 7th Cavalry and the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry remained in their positions from the 
previous night overlooking Lorengau. The route to Lorengau Township was known to be 
mined with command detonated anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, the mines running 
from the hills surrounding Lorengau to the beach just across the river. But the river 
crossing was unopposed and the troops advanced with only light resistance against them. 
The reason the mines were never detonated was discovered when a defender was found in 
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a bunker dead from concussion with the detonator still in his hand. Each remaining 
bunker had to be silenced individually. The remaining defenders retreated into the hills 
over Number Two Road towards Rossum. The afternoon was spent in bringing up the 2nd 
Squadron, 8th Cavalry and fortifying positions in Lorengau Township. Patrols were sent 
out toward Salesia Plantation. The patrols used a buffalo moving off shore as a fire 
support team while the patrol closed on the Japanese bunkers. Seven bunkers along the 
route were cleared this way with only light resistance. To avoid the possible use of the 
bunkers by Japanese defenders, the bunkers were destroyed with captured naval mines.116  
 That night General Mudge directed the 7th and 8th Cavalry to clear Manus of all 
remaining Japanese.  The morning of 19 March the 7th Cavalry patrolled close to 
Lorengau and made preparations for the intensive movements that would come on 20 
March. The 8th Cavalry sent Troop B down the Salesia Track to McElroys Plantation, 
where they dug in for the night.  A Troop was given the task of patrolling Number Two 
Road towards Rossum. Using captured documents, the patrol leader was briefed on the 
expected opposition. Almost as soon as leaving the perimeter, the patrol came under fire 
from a pair of mutually supporting bunkers, wounding the patrol leader and one other 
man. The platoon sergeant then took command of the patrol and attempted to flank the 
bunkers. When he was unable to do so he “decided as long as his mission was one of 
reconnaissance, it was time to withdraw and report.”117
 When the platoon sergeant reported that the enemy was in strength not more than 
two hundred yards down the road another patrol was dispatched. This time, Troop A and 
a weapons platoon with machine guns and two 37mm anti-tank guns were given the task. 
As the patrol moved down the road it came under sniper fire, but the snipers were killed 
in flanking movements. The patrol then moved down the road to the location of the 
earlier resistance at the two bunkers. When the patrol came under fire from these two 
bunkers, the attached 60mm mortars and the two 37mm anti-tank guns fired on the 
bunkers knocking them out with six hits. The patrol was able to move down the road a 
total of five hundred yards where they stopped. Troop A was relieved in place by Troop 
C just in time to meet the Japanese counterattack. In the resulting battle two men were 
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killed and ten wounded. Although it was now dark, the decision was made to evacuate 
the wounded down the road. The stretcher bearers were fired on as they approached the 
perimeter near Lorengau, killing four and wounding six more. Troop C received 
intermittent sniper and machine gun fire during the night.118
 That night at the beach head near Lorengau there was one of those darkly funny 
moments that occur in war. Just before dark, a large group of men noticed movement in 
the hills overlooking Lorengau. A single Japanese sniper had been observed climbing a 
tree about 1200 yards from the perimeter. It is claimed that over one hundred rifles and 
machine guns fired on him to no effect. A mortar crew from the weapons troop observed 
the action and “estimated the range and deflection, and without further ado or 
registraction (sic), dropped one each round, 81mm HE light, fuse quick, squarely in the 
crotch of the tree where the sniper lay.”119  
 
The Road to Rossum 
  In support of the 2nd Brigade, the 7th Cavalry sent out three patrols on the 
morning of 20 March. Troop A went down Road Number One toward the village of 
Tingo and returned in four days after no contacts. Troop B went by LCM toward the 
northern coast and made a reconnaissance of Brundralis Mission. Troop F was given the 
main task of reconnoitering Road Number 2, the road to Rossum. The road to Rossum 
was to be the last major engagement of the campaign.120
 While the orders and maps call the objective the Number Two Road or “Road to 
Rossum”, the G-3 Operations Report gives a much better description. “This track, a much 
more applicable and descriptive name, was along a spur to the main east-west ridge. It is 
flanked on both sides by precipitous banks descending into deep, swampy jungle covered 
ravines. The track is a narrow corridor and the enemy has taken full advantage of this 
canalized axis of advance.”121 This restricted maneuver room and the strong defensive 
positions help explain the resistance faced by the 7th Cavalry. The area before Rossum 
and the roads to it on Manus were the last place the Japanese offered organized 
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resistance. A description of the next couple days fighting can be summarized by an entry 
in the G-3 Historical Report, “Day after day it was the same. A heavy artillery barrage 
and an assault, a withdrawal, another barrage, another assault and so on till the 1st 
Squadron [7th Cavalry Regiments] troops were on their last legs.”122  Because the 
narratives and maps differ on the names of the obstacles and objectives, the names used 
here are based on map overlays from the Historical Report of the 7th Cavalry. 
 On 20 March at 0800 Troop F of the 7th Cavalry set off down Number Two Road 
with a “radio bantam” (Jeep), and an artillery tractor pulling a one ton trailer.123 By 1015 
the troop had moved through the 8th Cavalry positions and was proceeding inland. The 8th 
Cavalry was relieved by a platoon of Troop F, and they returned to their positions near 
Lorengau. The remainder of Troop F pushed inland and encountered resistance that was 
increasing as they moved towards the first objective of Ridge Number One. The troop 
sent out flanking patrols that reported “numerous shacks and supply dumps.”124  
 By 1500 the patrol leader reported that the enemy resistance was increasing all 
around him and that reaching Ridge Number One was not practical that day. The patrol 
attempted to withdraw to the ridge overlooking Lorengau, but either the Japanese had 
managed to sneak a group in behind the patrol and mine the road, or the vehicles had 
managed to miss them in their advance. As Troop F was withdrawing the tractor ran over 
a mine and blew off a track. The radio Jeep was unable to get around the tractor with 
trailer. After the radio was removed, the radio Jeep and trailer were abandoned. The 
patrol continued their withdrawal with the support of Troop E. The patrol dug in for the 
night with the rest of the 7th Cavalry near Lorengau. Fire was directed against the 
Japanese positions all night long in an effort to soften up their bunker network. The 7th 
Cavalry had lost 5 KIA and 11 WIA.125
 21 March was spent in looking for routes around the Japanese positions, but the 
jungle in the area is steep and impenetrable and no alternate routes were found. The 
Japanese positions were continually under fire from artillery and the RAAF P-40s. The 
main attack would advance down the road in the morning. 
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 The attack began at 0830 22 March with artillery, mortar, and rocket barrages on 
the Japanese defensive positions. B, C, and D Troops, along with two medium tanks and 
the very necessary bulldozers, tried to force their way down the road. The going was very 
slow and the route well defended. Each bunker had to be knocked out individually. They 
were well camouflaged, and usually the first the troopers saw of the bunker was the 
muzzle flash of a machine gun. At that point the troopers began a systematic reduction of 
the bunker. The troopers would then call for the tanks to move forward to use direct fire. 
The troopers would then sweep the mined road in front of the tanks, often under enemy 
fire. When necessary, which was often, the bulldozer had to either push or pull the tank 
into position. Once the bunker was silenced, the advance continued until the next bunker, 
where the sequence was repeated. Troops B, C, and D continued past Ridge Number One 
against “strong enemy opposition in the form of MG and knee mortar fire.”126 The patrol 
continued inland on the road until they were about three hundred yards from Ridge 
Number Two. Here the enemy fire was too intense for the patrol to advance. Major 
Godwin, the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Commander and patrol leader, requested 
permission to withdraw. When the Regimental Commander refused permission, the patrol 
dug in where they were for the night. The results for the day were less than 1500 yards 
gained at a cost of eleven KIA and twenty-nine WIA. Unfortunately, the next day would 
bring much of the same for the 7th Cavalry.127
 23 March opened with the usual artillery strike on the defending Japanese. At 
0900 Troops B and G moved up the road with two tanks and their bulldozers. As 
expected, enemy opposition was fierce and the troops came under fire as soon as they left 
the perimeter. Mortar fire had to be called in to suppress the Japanese so that the troopers 
could finally claim Ridge Number Two. A light tank moving up to Ridge Number Two 
hit a mine which blew off a track. As the troops moved down from Ridge Number Two 
they came under fire from more bunkers and attempted to retreat. Ridge Number Two 
was the site of the night’s defensive perimeter. Artillery fire continued through the night 
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preventing the Japanese from moving against the perimeter. The nine hundred yards 
gained during the day had cost the 7th Cavalry Regiment three KIA and twenty WIA.128
 On 24 March the attacking elements of the 7th Cavalry were reinforced with a 
medium tank. Following the usual artillery barrage the attack set off at 1142. The tank 
soon proved to be a liability to the troops; it could not leave the road and the tank 
commander refused to move forward until the road had been swept of mines. But 
Japanese defenders quickly brought both the mine sweeping troops and tank under fire 
and halted the advance at 1250. At 1320 the patrol requested permission to withdraw to 
Ridge Number Two. Permission was granted and the old positions were reoccupied. The 
remainder of the day was turned over to the artillery and RAAF. The artillery, in response 
to the ineffectiveness of their fire, began using delayed fuses to penetrate the jungle and 
reduce tree bursts. The RAAF strike used different colored smoke for each strike, calling 
in strikes based on the direction and color of the smoke. With the 7th Cavalry in the same 
positions it had occupied the night before the net gain was zero yards at a cost of four 
KIA and twenty WIA. Troop B had borne the brunt of the attacks and lost two 
commanders, 87% of its officers, and 10% of the enlisted men. Artillery fire continued 
throughout the night.129
 25 March saw the end of the 7th Cavalry’s participation in the Rossum attacks. At 
0900 they pulled back five hundred yards for an intense barrage of artillery, mortars, 
rockets, and air attacks against the remaining Japanese positions. The 1st Squadron, 8th 
Cavalry passed through the lines of the 7th Cavalry under cover of artillery from the 61st 
and 99th Field Artillery Battalions at 0930.  The 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry made slow 
progress against the positions around Rossum. The two tanks had to have the road swept 
for mines, a job the troops dreaded because they were totally exposed to enemy fire. 
Continuous sniper fire and the thick jungle terrain forced the troops to confine their 
advance to the only track to Rossum. It was not until 1500 that the 1st Squadron was in 
position to finally take Rossum. Under the fire of 81mm mortars the 1st Squadron made 
the final attack on the village. The remaining bunkers fired at the squadron with rifle, 
machine gun, and mortar fire. Once the Japanese realized that their positions were being 
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overrun, the survivors ran for the jungle. Very few of the Japanese actually made the 
cover of the jungle due to the rifle fire of the enraged troops.130
 7th Cavalry operations for the next four days, 26-29 March, were confined to 
patrolling in the Rossum and Lorengau areas. The 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry uncovered 
numerous caches of Japanese supplies, mainly ammunition and rations. The Japanese 
who had survived the attacks were living off the land and attempting to resist individually 
or in small groups where they could. By 30 March the squadron had returned to Lorengau 
while the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry was making preparations for an attack on Pityilu 
Island.131
 
Pityilu Island 
 Pityilu Island is one of the larger islands forming Seeadler Harbor. Almost three 
miles long it varies in width from 250 to 650 yards. Pityilu Island “had been 
intermittently bombed and strafed by aircraft and shelled by destroyers for about two 
weeks.”132 About fifty to sixty Japanese were believed to be concentrated in the jungle on 
the eastern half of the island; the western end of the island was a coconut plantation and 
was believed to be largely undefended. The attack by the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry was 
reinforced with a detachment of the 8th Engineer Battalion, amphibious trucks and 
buffalos, one light tank, one medium tank, and additional medical support from the 27th 
Portable Surgical Hospital. Because of the experiences on Hauwei Island, the preliminary 
bombardment and striking power of the force were to be massive.  On 30 March, under 
cover of the bombardment the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry landed unopposed at 0845 in the 
center of the island on the south shore where the island is only 250 yards across. The 
troops quickly advanced across the island and established a perimeter cutting the island in 
half. Patrols were sent out to locate enemy positions and to estimate strength. Concern 
centered on the right flank at the eastern end of the island. All patrols reported back by 
1000 having encountered no resistance. Troops A and B moved out to the east at 1015. B 
Troop was fired on by a light machine gun concealed in a bunker under a shack. The four 
Japanese in the position were silenced quickly. Seven more Japanese were encountered as 
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B Troop advanced and they were quickly killed. The main resistance encountered was at 
1430 when twenty-one Japanese in a trench fired on B Troop wounding three men. 
Private Lahman advanced on the position with his Browning Automatic Rifle, BAR, and 
“unhesitatingly and repeatedly fired clip after clip as he moved forward.”133 Troop A was 
fired on by a concealed bunker which they silenced with the medium tank. Progress was 
slow since every bunker and emplacement encountered had to be destroyed. With 
darkness falling the squadron withdrew to the edge of the jungle and dug in for the night. 
What they did not know at the time was that all the Japanese on the island had already 
been killed or wounded. In the morning after a bombardment of the eastern end of the 
island the squadron moved out at 0730. By 1225 the squadron had reached the eastern tip 
of the island without encountering any resistance. The 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry returned 
to the landing beach and returned to Lorengau. The cost in American casualties was eight 
KIA, six WIA while fifty-nine dead Japanese were counted.134  
 With the return to Lorengau the 7th Cavalry patrolled the surrounding area and the 
interior of Manus. The Japanese encountered on these patrols were, for the most part, 
sick, wounded, or starving. For the 7th Cavalry, the major difficulty was re-supply. The 
constant rains and the terrain turned the few roads available into impassable quagmires. 
Local natives were employed as porters and scouts. The natives were able to move a 
forty-one pound box of K-rations “from SABON to YIRINGO in about 3 ½ hours 
whereas the average soldier required two to three days.”135 Alternate re-supply methods 
included the use of tractors or buffalos and DUKWs over water. By 5 May the entire 7th 
Cavalry had returned to Hauwei Island where it established its base camp.136  
 
Clearing Operations 
 For the remainder of the island clearing operations the responsibility fell to the 
12th Cavalry Regiment at its old camp at Lombrum Point. On 30 March they were told of 
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the plans for future operations against the islands that make up Seeadler Harbor. The first 
landings would take place on 1 April on Koruniat Island and Ndrillo Island.  
 First to be cleared was Koruniat Island. A preparatory barrage was laid down on 
Koruniat Island by artillery, rocket boats, and the RAAF. After thirty minutes the 1st 
Squadron, 12th Cavalry jumped off at 0700 on 1 April. The landing was unopposed and 
by 1200 the troops had swept the island. Finding no Japanese on the island, the squadron 
moved to Ndrilo Island and found it unoccupied. The squadron dug in for the night and 
the morning of 2 April returned to Lombrum Point on Los Negros.137
 The morning of 3 April the 2nd Squadron of the 12th Cavalry loaded on destroyers 
for a landing on Rambutyo Island. Rambutyo is a fairly large island eleven miles long 
and five miles wide located off the southern coast of Los Negros. The 2nd Squadron, 12th 
Cavalry landed unopposed at 1200 after the initial bombardment. The landing was more 
difficult than other landings in the Admiralties because of the rough seas and the lack of a 
decent landing beach. The landing craft could not actually land and had to let the troops 
off into the water, forcing them to wade ashore. Once ashore, the troops found the terrain 
extremely difficult to move through. The jungle was thick and mountainous; the troops 
had difficulty moving inland. Any surviving Japanese on the island found it easy to evade 
the pursuing troops by hiding in caves and ravines where the squadron could not find 
them. The 2nd Squadron, 12th Cavalry spent nearly three weeks on the island patrolling 
and in the end killed thirty-one Japanese and captured two. At the end of the operation 
the squadron returned to the regimental bivouac area at Salami Plantation on 24 April.138   
 On 9 April the 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry landed unopposed on Pak Island. While 
a headquarters was established at a European plantation house, patrols were sent to the 
west end of the island. After finding no Japanese, the patrols returned to the headquarters 
house and established a perimeter for the night. The next morning Troops A and C were 
sent to patrol the east end of the island. The patrol was fired on by Japanese soldiers in a 
cave; a flame thrower was brought forward to assist in the assault on the cave. With the 
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enemy fire stopped the cave was sealed with TNT trapping the surviving Japanese in the 
cave. The squadron counted fifteen Japanese dead and three captured.139  
 Once the remaining small islands had been swept for Japanese, the campaign was 
declared closed on 18 May. The division had lost two hundred ninety KIA, one thousand 
nine hundred seventy-six WIA. The known Japanese losses were three thousand three 
hundred seventeen KIA and eighty-two POW. Japanese survivors escaped to the northern 
part of Manus where some managed to survive the war. U.S. troops would occasionally 
go on patrol looking for survivors as a way of indoctrinating fresh troops. The division 
liberated thirty-six Chinese and seventy-one Sikhs labor troops.140
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The conquest of the Admiralty Islands was one of the most daring operations 
MacArthur staged in World War Two. The “Reconnaissance in Force”, instead of the full 
scale invasion that was planned, took the Japanese by surprise and allowed Allied forces 
to gain momentum in the assault against the Japanese. As we have seen, the cost in men 
was relatively light and in return the Allies took possession of one of the finest natural 
harbors in the South Pacific. The capture of the Admiralties completed the encirclement 
of Rabaul and made a frontal assault unnecessary. By seizing the Admiralties, MacArthur 
was also able to avoid attacking the 18th Army at Wewak and instead by-passed it to take 
the relatively lightly defended port of Hollandia far to the west on the New Guinea 
coast.141
 One major concern was who would control the base. MacArthur believed that 
because it was in his area of operations he should control the base and give priority to 
organizations under his command. Admiral Nimitz believed that because the navy was 
building the majority of facilities and the base would primarily service navy ships he 
should control the base. After much heated deliberation a compromise was reached, 
MacArthur would be the ultimate commander of the facilities, but he would provide 
services to any and all Allied services that used the bases.142    
 
Construction 
 The first engineers to land were a detachment of the 8th Engineer Battalion, a part 
of the 1st Cavalry Division. While the 1st Cavalry was fighting for control of the islands, 
the engineers were working on repairs to existing facilities and making infrastructure 
improvements. The 8th Engineer Battalion was primarily responsible for the operational 
requirements of the division. They brought with them 7 bulldozers, 6 carryalls, 2 road 
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graders, a crane, and a sawmill. They improved roads and off-loading areas that made the 
initial work easier for the successive engineer units to arrive.143    
 The construction of bases on Los Negros began when the 40th Seabees, along with 
a regimental task group of the 2nd Special Brigade, landed on 2 March. The Seabees 
began clearing Momote airfield even before they were totally relieved of combat duties. 
The detachment from the 2nd Special Brigade was put to work in amphibious operations, 
especially on 15 March with the landings on Manus. Momote airfield was first put into 
operation on 7 March when a B-25 made an emergency landing. On 9 March, twelve 
Kittyhawks from No.76 Squadron R.A.A.F. landed and immediately became operational 
in support of the 1st Cavalry Division operations on the islands. Twelve more Kittyhawks 
landed the next day putting the total strength at twenty-four Kittyhawks. Other R.A.A.F. 
units were soon operational at Momote and other Allied aircraft began to use the field. 
 The 5th Cavalry Regiment, elements of which had landed on the first day, began 
to move to Koruniat Island on 3 April. The 5th Cavalry began construction on a base 
camp that by 19 April had “a theater, boxing ring, PX and Red Cross buildings . . . volley 
ball and basket ball courts and an excellent beach for swimming . . . A chapel was built to 
seat 400 men.”144  
 During the middle of March a detachment of Headquarters, 931st Aviation 
Regiment arrived. By 1 April they had been joined by the 836th Aviation Battalion and 
the 617th Base Equipment Company and the 104th Seabees. These units enlarged Momote 
airfield and because the field at Lorengau was impractical to recondition an air field was 
built at Mokerang. By 1 June Momote airfield had grown to 7,800 feet in length. 
Necessary taxiways and hardstands were constructed to accommodate ninety fighters and 
eighty heavy bombers. Fuel requirements were met with a 17,000 barrel tank farm and 
the means to offload more from a jetty in Hayne Harbor. All the necessary storage and 
administrative buildings had also been completed.145
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 Originally Mokerang had an 8,500 foot bomber runway that was constructed 
along with taxiways and hardstands for 50 bombers. Bombers from the 307th Bomber 
Group 13th Air Force flew in from Munda, New Georgia on 21 April and the field was 
officially completed on 22 April. As resources and time allowed, the original taxiway 
was enlarged and two more taxiways were constructed. Additionally, one more airstrip of 
equal size was added. Shops, personnel facilities, and a 30,000 barrel tank farm were 
added to support operations.146
 At Hayne Harbor the Seabees constructed a five hundred bed evacuation hospital. 
The harbor was improved to include two cargo ship wharves, an eight hundred foot long 
fuel pier, small boat repair facilities, and a repair pier with a fixed crane. A pontoon 
assembly depot was constructed that could turn out nine hundred pontoon cells per 
month. The adjacent housing and administration area could house fifty officers and five 
hundred enlisted men in forty huts. Momote was further improved to include an aviation 
supply depot of twenty-four steel warehouses and eighty-three Quonset huts and an 
aviation repair and overhaul unit with twenty-five steel buildings. An additional naval 
airstrip 5,000 feet long was built with hardstands. Another 7,000 barrel fuel storage farm 
was added to the Hayne Harbor complex.147
 Construction projects at Papitalai Point were started on 18 April. The first project 
was a thirty foot wide road connecting Papitalai Point with Lombrum. A dry-dock storage 
area was built which included “seven 40 by 100 foot warehouses, twenty-nine Quonset 
huts, a mess hall, a galley, a water system, and a coconut-log, coral-fill jetty, 40 by 80 
feet.”148 A PT-boat overhaul base with personnel camp was also constructed with the 
assorted support buildings needed. To fuel the large numbers of expected ships a tank 
farm of sixty-three tanks, each holding 10,000 barrels, was begun on 23 June. By 15 
August twenty-five tanks had been completed and eventually the entire farm was 
completed.149
 At Lombrum Point three major projects were completed. The landing-craft repair 
base had a 250 ton pontoon dry-docks, six warehouses, two Quonset huts, and all the 
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necessary camp facilities. A ship repair base for capital ships was constructed with three 
docks; a 100,000 ton, a 70,000 ton, and an 18,000 ton dock. Ships up to battleships could 
use these facilities. A sea plane base was also constructed with a 50 by 250 foot concrete 
launching and recovery pad, a nose hanger, and an 8,000 barrel tank farm for aviation 
fuel. All the necessary support buildings and docks were built to make it a complete 
facility.150  
 Manus Island was also subject to the Seabees’ efforts. The primary installation 
located next to the Lorengau airstrip, which had been declared unfit for use, was a supply 
depot of one hundred twenty-eight storage buildings, fifty 6,800 cubic foot refrigerators, 
an eight hundred foot pier, a five hundred foot pier, an LST landing beach, and five miles 
of auxiliary roads. The supply depot was officially opened on 2 July. All these facilities 
would have been useless without water. A major project was needed to supply the 
facilities and personnel that would be using Manus. A water system that produced on 
average 4,000,000 gallons per day was constructed. The Lombrum River was tapped for 
the majority of the supply, with other small streams and wells providing the balance. The 
whole system was tied together and treated then gravity fed to the users with the help of 
some pumps where needed.151
 To oversee the entire Admiralty Island complex a central base was constructed at 
the mouth of the Lorengau River. This was a complete city in itself. The base had all the 
necessary buildings for the administration of the islands, forty-eight Quonset huts just for 
officers, quarters for enlisted men, and a 2,000 man mess hall. A 1,000 man hospital with 
eight wards, five operating rooms, and its own 1,000 man mess hall was collocated with 
the administration facilities. To help complete the city a 5,000 man receiving station was 
constructed, complete with its own mess halls and facilities.152
 Two airfields for carrier aircraft were constructed. On Ponam Island a 5,000 feet 
runway and support buildings to handle 1,500 men with an 8,000 barrel tank farm that 
supplied the base with aviation gasoline. On Pityilu Island the airfield was 4,500 feet long 
with parking areas for 350 planes.  A 7,000 barrel tank farm was constructed for the 
airfield, complete with a pipeline for replenishment of the tank farm. The island had 
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accommodations for 350 officers and 1,400 men. This base was operational by June; later 
the base was enlarged to handle 2,500 men, the airfield was extended by 1,000 feet, and 
the clinic was upgraded to a small 100 bed hospital. The eastern end of the island was 
leveled to create a fleet recreation center capable of handling up to 10,000 men at once.153  
 At a cost in lives of 290 Americans killed and 1,976 wounded and a cost in 
money of $131,757,843, the Allies got a major base from which to press home the attack 
against the Japanese. During the 1944 offensives the Admiralties were used as a main 
naval repair depot. In addition they were used as airfields for supply, bombing, and 
reconnaissance missions. Throughout the remainder of the war as the Allies advanced on 
the Japanese home islands, Seeadler Harbor was used as a staging point in coming 
operations.154
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